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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
A. Introduction
In the law of sales of goods' and land,2 no topic has proven more troubling
in modem times than the allocation of risk of loss.3 There are efforts now
underway to rewrite the risk of loss provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
governing sales of goods, demonstrating that the topic of risk of loss remains both
important and deeply troubled. The revision efforts come some half of a century
after the Code's provisions were first drafted by Karl Llewellyn.' Those efforts
coincide with the 100th anniversary of one of the most significant scholarly
works ever to address the topic of risk of loss, a set of articles by Samuel
1. The writings of Karl Llewellyn leading up to his drafting of the current Uniform Commercial Code
make clear that risk of loss was one of the most troubling aspects of sales law and that reform of those rules
was a primary motivation for developing the Code to replace the Uniform Sales Act. See infra notes 235-63
and accompanying text.
The difficulties and controversies of risk of loss law have also been noted in regard to efforts to develop
an international law of sales of goods. See John Honnold, A Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA.
L. REa. 299, 316 (1959) ("Risk of loss presents [the] most significant and challenging opportunity for
improvement."); P.M. Roth, The Passing of Risk, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 291,291 (1979) (describing risk of loss
as "'one of the most serious problems presented.. ."); Douglas E. Goodfriend, Note, After the Damage is
Done: Risk of Loss Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
22 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 575, 577 (1984) (noting the particular difficulty risk of loss presented in drafting
of the Convention).
Problematic rules as to risk of loss raise far greater concerns than one might assume based on the cases
litigated, because so many other issues in a sale transaction are affected by the transfer of risk of loss. See JOHN
HONNOLD ET'AL., LAW OF SALES AND SECURED FINANCING 383 (6th ed. 1993) [hereinafter HONNOLD, LAW
OF SALES] ("The point at which risk of loss passes is thus of greater practical significance than would be
indicated.').
2. See Sidney P. Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: I1,
44 YALE L.J. 754, 754 (1935) [hereinafter Simpson, I] ("Perhaps the most debated question in the law of
vendor and purchaser is that of the allocation of the burden of [risk of] loss between the parties . . :); see also
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.30 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); Robert L. Flores, A Comparison of the
Rules and Rationales for Allocating Risks Arising in Realty Sales Using Executory Sale Contracts and
Escrows, 59 Mo. L. REV. 307 (1994) [hereinafter Flores, Comparison].
3. Risk of loss rules apply when land or goods that are under contract for sale suffer accidental loss,
and the loss must be allocated as between the seller and buyer. For example, goods that are subject to a contract
for sale might be partly damaged or completely destroyed by fire, weather, or vandalism. Risk of loss rules
determine which party-seller or buyer--bears the burden of loss to the value of the goods arising from such
an occurrence. See HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1.
4. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Study Group: Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2 Preliminary Report (1990), reprinted in ABA Task Force, An Appraisal of the
March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 981 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Report] (identifying risk of loss as one topic needing sufficient reform
to justify a project to revise the Code).
5. See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
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Williston.6 With the watershed revision of the Code now underway, and in light
of the historical significance of this centennial anniversary, it is especially
appropriate now to thoroughly examine the modem history of risk of loss
doctrine.
The premise of this article is that the conventional view of the modem history
of risk of loss in sales of goods is seriously in error. There is a significant chapter
missing from that conventional view. The missing chapter ties together the law
of risk of loss in sales of land and in sales of goods. It shows that much of the
credit for development of the modem doctrine belongs to Williston, and not to
Llewellyn alone. Among other effects, the longstanding conventional failure to
recognize the missing chapter means that the current rewriting of the Code is
being undertaken with a deficient understanding of the origins of the provisions
targeted for revision.
The objective of this article is to reconstruct this missing chapter of history.
In doing so, this article lays a foundation for an accurate understanding of the
historical origins and underlying principles of the modem rules of risk of loss in
sales of goods, and a greater understanding of the benefits available from
exploration of the historical relationship between land law and goods law.
The remaining portions of Part I of this article provide an overview of the
missing historical chapter and a brief description of the Code revision efforts now
being undertaken without benefit of that missing chapter. The balance of the
article lays out in detail the missing chapter of history. Part II describes the
parallels in the development of risk of loss doctrine in land sales and goods sales
through the 19th century. Part I describes a revolution led by Williston as to risk
of loss doctrine in sales of land. Part IV examines Llewellyn's revolution in the
risk of loss doctrine in sales of goods. In both Parts III and IV, the article
demonstrates that Llewellyn modelled his work on the Code's risk of loss pro-
visions after the doctrine developed by Williston in sales of land.
B. Overview of the Missing Chapter in the History of the Code
The contents of this missing chapter are likely to be surprising to those
familiar with the accepted version of the Code's history. The overlooked infor-
mation directly contradicts major tenets of the conventional story.
The conventional view is that risk of loss doctrine in sales of land and the
doctrine in sales of goods, though stemming from one common source, have been
almost entirely separate and different for centuries.7 In particular the view is that
6. See Samuel Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 9
HARv. L. REV. 72 (1895) [hereinafter Williston, Civil Law]; Samuel Williston, The Risk of Loss After an
Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 HARV. L. REV. 106 (1895) [hereinafter Williston, Common
Law].
7. See, e.g., HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1, at 384 n.2.
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goods law has not benefitted from developments in risk of loss doctrine in the
field of land sales, a view stated by Karl Llewellyn himself.' Consequently, the
conventional view holds that little of value for understanding goods sales law can
be gained by examining the development of risk of loss doctrine in sales of land.
In fact, the missing chapter shows that at the very time he was stating that view,
Llewellyn was aware of the innovations taking place in land sales law, and would
soon borrow from them to reform goods sales law.
A revolution in thinking about risk of loss in sales of land, begun decades
before Llewellyn's time, culminated in the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk
Act in the 1930s, reflecting major innovations in risk of loss theory.9 Llewellyn,
though otherwise not versed in the field of sales of land, actively involved himself
in the promulgation of the Risk Act, and thus was exposed to the innovations it
represented."0
Shortly after that experience, Llewellyn began presenting proposals for the
radical reformation of the law of risk of loss in sales of goods." Eventually he
incorporated those reforms into the Code. 2 The innovations in sales of goods
attributed to Llewellyn are strikingly similar to those which had already been
achieved in sales of land. 3 Most importantly, the innovations achieved in land
law involved a de-emphasis of the use of status of ownership as a basis for
allocating risk of loss, and an integration of other principles for loss allocation.
Essentially, the Code's drafters carried the same change into the Code for goods
law, and in the conventional view, that shift of underlying principles is recognized
as the single most significant change in risk of loss doctrine wrought by
promulgation of the Code. 4
The prior development of innovative theory in the law of land sales,
Llewellyn's relationship with the Risk Act, and the evident influence of that
experience on his drafting of the Code, are facts overlooked in the conventional
view of the Code's history.
The conventional view is that Llewellyn led the revolution in goods law, and
that Samuel Williston was at best not a contributor and at worst the leading
opponent of needed reform. 5 This conventional painting of Williston as the
8. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REy. 873, 873 (1939)
(asserting that goods sales law had been marked off and cut loose from land sales law long before modem risk
of loss doctrine had been developed).
9. See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 235-63 and accompanying text.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., HONNOLD, LAw OFSALES, supra note 1, at 386.
15. See, e.g., id. (noting Williston's objections to the Code); DONALD B. KING, THE NEW
CONC'EPTUALISM OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 89 (1968); John Honnold, The Sales Convention:
Background, Status, Application, 8 J.L. & COM. 1, 1 (1988); Preliminary Report, supra note 4, at 1121 n.1
(Article 2, Part 4).
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enemy of needed modernization, specifically in risk of loss doctrine, coincides
with the more general conventional view of his approach to goods sales law and
contracts law generally. Critics have generally branded Williston as a rigid
formalistic thinker, unable to appreciate the benefits of Llewellyn's revolutionary
ideas.16 The conventional view is not entirely without historical support. Williston
did in fact oppose the enactment of the Code, and in part based his opposition on
the new Code's treatment of risk of loSS.
1 7
However, there are significant aspects of Williston's role that are missing
from the conventional view. His famed opposition to the Code came in 1950,
when he was nearly 90 years old.t8 Beginning half a century earlier, it was the
young scholar Williston who led the revolution in thinking about risk of loss in
sales of land, the same revolution which Llewellyn then carried into sales of
goods. Williston led that revolution in land sales law from his seminal articles in
1895, through his important Contracts treatise, his drafting of the Restatement
(First) of Contracts, and finally, into his drafting of the Uniform Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act. t9 During the later stages in Williston's campaign, Llewellyn
was extensively exposed to the innovative ideas that he would later bring to the
Code.
The story twists even further. In the drafting of the Risk Act for land sales,
Llewellyn briefly played the role of opponent to the important theoretical
innovations Williston sought.2° Yet soon afterward, Llewellyn took the same
innovations and made them a central feature of his own campaign for reform of
the law in sales of goods.
The full story of Williston's role in developing an innovative approach to risk
of loss in sales of land is not well-known even to scholars in the land sales field.2'
The conventional view of the Code's history has entirely overlooked the role that
Williston's realty sales groundwork served in the development of the modem law
16. See, e.g., Anthony J. Waters, Book Review, 36 MD. L. REV. 270,272-73 (1976) (reviewing GRANT
GILMIORE, Tam DEATH OF CONTRACT) (describing Williston's work as a "shrine to certainty" with the
"fundamental failing" of "inflexibility").
17. Williston drafted the Uniform Sales Act, which the Code was designed to replace, and when
Llewellyn presented the Code for adoption, Williston objected. See infra notes 297-310 and accompanying
text.
18. See id.
19. See infra notes 83-228 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
21. While many land sales writers have referred to Williston's early article and treatise, and some have
noted his role in promulgation of the Risk Act, they have generally not taken account of the importance the
Contracts Restatement played in Williston's overall reform campaign. See, e.g., Simpson, II, supra note 2, at
757-59, 769; 3 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2; ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 10.13, at 743-44 (2d ed. 1993); 1 MmToN R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES oFREAL
PROPERTY § 4.11, at 507-14(5th ed. 1991); HENRY L. MCLNTOCK, HANDBOOK OFTHE PRINCIPLES OF EQUrrY
§ 113 (2d ed. 1948); 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 99.09 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); Milton M.
Hermann, The Doctrine of Equitable Conversion: L Conversion by Contract, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1962).
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of risk of loss in sales of goods.22Llewellyn may well have fostered this oversight
by his silence on the point.
The conventional view of the history of the Code's risk of loss provisions
also fails to adequately recognize the role of Arthur Corbin. Corbin is not con-
ventionally viewed as having had any significant role in Llewellyn's drafting of
the risk of loss provisions. 24 In fact, Corbin appears to have had an important role
as sort of an intermediary between Williston's work in land sales and Llewellyn's
work in goods sales.25
Thus the conventional view of the Code's history gives Llewellyn credit for
too much, and Williston and Corbin credit for too little. More importantly, the
conventional view fails to recognize that the developments that occurred in the
law of land sales-particularly Williston's work in that field-can be valuable
resources to use in understanding the current risk of loss provisions in the Code.
That understanding is needed now more than ever, given the present efforts to
rewrite the Code.
C. Relevance of the Missing History to Current Plans for Revision of the
Code
The criticisms that have led to the current rewriting efforts began at least as
early as the 1960s, a period in which the states first widely enacted the Code?
6
22. See, e.g., HONNOLD, LAW OF SALEs, supra note 1, at 386; Hiram Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill
as Viewed by the Merchant and the Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REV. 537 (1940). Even in the extensive tributes
made to Williston upon his death, recounting his many other accomplishments, no reference was made to his
contributions to the innovative risk of loss doctrine in the Code. See Samuel Williston: An Inadequate Tribute
to a Beloved Teacher, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1321 (1963) (presenting tributes by Frankfurter and others).
23. Llewellyn's publications regarding the risk of loss doctrine incorporated in the Code included no
mention of his relationship with Williston's Risk Act, and no acknowledgment of Llewellyn's debt to land
sales law generally or to Williston in particular. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA.
L. REV. 558 (1940); Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, supra note 8; Karl N. Llewellyn, Across
Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939); Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit
Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Through Title].
24. For typical descriptions of the genesis of the Code, see Robert Braucher, The Legislative History
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799-801 (1958), and the sources cited therein. See
also Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our
New Commercial Law, 11 VI.L. L. REv. 213, 222-24,236 (1966).
25. Corbin worked closely with Williston in an important phase of Williston's campaign for reform of
land sales law, the Restatement (First) of Contracts. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. Corbin
took that experience with him to the work on the Code, where he served as a primary advisor in the drafting
process, and then as a primary lobbyist for acceptance of the Code. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE LJ. 821 (1950).
26. Some criticism in the 1950s was directed at the risk of loss provisions while the Code was still in
the drafting process. See, e.g., 1 N.Y.L. REvISION COMM'N REP. 492-99 (1955) (providing an analysis of the
1952 versions of Sections 2-509, 2-510, prepared for the New York Law Revision Commission by John
Honnold).
The drafters officially promulgated the current Code in 1958 and several years elapsed before critics
began focussing on perceived defects in the risk of loss provisions. One commentator offered an early critique
167
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Fueled by the increasing attention to the tools of economic analysis of law,27 and
by developments in international law governing international sales,28 critics
increasingly targeted the Code's risk of loss provisions in the 1980s and early
1990s.29 In 1990, a study group appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board of
the Code submitted a report urging that the Code's risk of loss provisions be sub-
stantially revised.30 In 1994, the Board's drafting committee submitted a first
discussion draft implementing the recommended revisions of Article 2 of the
Code.31
From the beginning of that criticism the debate regarding the Code's risk of
loss provisions has focussed on the mix of principles that drive those provisions.
One effect of the revolution from pre-Code to Code rules was a shift from
principles of ownership, that is, property law, to principles of contract law. Other
effects were the incorporation of principles of loss prevention and the maximi-
zation of insurance coverage. As with pre-Code law, the rules of the Code also
retained a role for principles of fault, allocating risk based on one party's
wrongful act.32 Criticism of the Code has come in the form of a debate about how
all of those principles should be balanced.
of the risk of loss rules in 1968. See KING, supra note 15, at 53.
27. Critics of the Code's risk of loss provisions have made much use of modern economic analysis of
law tools. The Code's critics began to focus most heavily on the risk of loss provisions after the spate of
economic analysis literature that appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. The extent to which contract scholars and
commercial law scholars focussed on economic analysis of law tools in that period likely heightened the
attractiveness of those tools for addressing the risk of loss provisions. See generally Robert L. Birmingham,
A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light
of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 1393 (1969); Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the
Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 312 (1982); John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics,
44 Sw. U. L. REv. 1139 (1990); Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283
(1990); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 105-07 (1977); Richard E. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance In
Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L. REv. 241, 255-57 (1980); Stephen S.
Ashley, Note, The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1251, 1258-70
(1975).
28. See Mitchell Stocks, Risk of Loss Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Revision
of UCC Sections 2-509 and 2-510, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1415 (1993).
29. See JAMES J. WarrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-5, at 176-77 (4th
ed. 1994); Margaret Howard, Allocation of Risk of Loss Under the UCC: A Transactional Evaluation of
Sections 2-509 and 2-510, 15 UCC Li. 334 (1983); F. Carlton King, Jr., UCC Section 2-510-A Rule Without
Reason, 77 COM. LJ. 272 (1972); Stocks, supra note 28, at 1441-49; Roger S. Goldman, Note, Risk of Loss
in Commercial Transactions: Efficiency Thrown Into the Breach, 65 VA. L. REV. 557 (1979).
30. See Preliminary Report, supra note 4, at 1150-55 (Article 2, Part 5, Recommendations 6,7).
31. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code,
Revised Article 2 Sales, May 1, 1994 Discussion Draft, Revised Section 2-509, Reporter's Notes [hereinafter
1994 Draft]. See generally Symposium, The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WM.
& MARYL. REV. 1299 (1994).
32. See U.C.C. §§ 2-509,2-510 (1990). For further explanation of the mix of principles in the current
Code's risk of loss provisions, see infra notes 279-96 and accompanying text.
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For example, the most powerful voices have argued that the current rules
place too little weight on the policy of imposing risk on the party most likely to
have insurance coverage, and too much weight on other principles."3 Those critics
have so far succeeded in persuading the drafting committee to eliminate a key
provision of the current rules, section 2-510, because it is perceived to poorly
balance the underlying principles of the rule.34 On the other hand, some argue that
those conventional critics fail to understand the true intended balance of the
principles in the Code.35
That debate will not be resolved here, nor even fully described. That current
debate is important, however, in that it shows how vital it is to have a full under-
standing of the principles intended by the Code's original drafters to guide the
risk of loss provisions. This author contends that such a full understanding cannot
be had without reference to the missing historical chapter detailed here. The blend
of principles that underlie the current rules of the Code came about largely
through Williston's work in the field of sales of land. Any comprehensive study
of the history and underlying theories of the Code's rules should include that
long-overlooked chapter.
Parts II, I1, and IV of this article will bring to light the missing chapter in the
history of the Code.
II. RISK OF Loss IN SALES OF LAND AND SALES OF GOODS TO THE END OF THE
19TH CENTURY: EARLY PARALLELS-REs PERIT DOMINO
The Anglo-American law on risk of loss can be traced at least to 13th century
doctrine, described by both Bracton and Glanville. Their descriptions show that
land and goods were treated alike, that risk doctrine was based on a principle of
ownership, and that possession determined ownership. Risk of loss fell to the
party defined as the owner at the time of loss. Ownership passed from seller to
buyer only upon delivery of possession. Bracton cited two examples of this view:
a loss resulting from the burning of a house under contract for sale and one
resulting from the death of an ox under contract for sale. The rule in both cases
was that a loss occurring before delivery of possession to the buyer fell on the
33. See supra note 29.
34. See Preliminary Report, supra note 4, at 1154 (Article 2, Part 5, Recommendation 7); 1994 Draft,
supra note 31, § 2-509, Reporter's Notes.
35. See William L. Stallworth, The Contractual Approach: Resurrection of a New Theory and Analytic
Framework for Risk of Loss Problems in Commercial Transactions Governed by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, (forthcoming--temporarily cited in Westlaw law review abstract file, 1995 WL 59601
(L.R.A.C.)) (providing the most thoughtful response opposing the critics and the planned revisions of the
Code).
The drafting committee has not entirely accepted the views taken by the majority of critics. In its 1994
draft, the committee refused to go to the extent of entirely eliminating the much-criticized provisions of section
2-510 of the Code. See 1994 Draft, supra note 31, § 2-509 Reporter's Note.
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seller "because in truth, he who has not delivered a thing to the purchaser, is still
himself the lord of it."
36
The underlying principle, that risk followed ownership, came to be
commonly expressed in Anglo-American statements of law using the Latin
phrases, resperit domino (the risk of the thing lies with its owner), typically used
in reference to goods, 7 and damnum ex casu sentit dominus (injury falls on the
owner), typically used in reference to land.38
The early law operated on a simple equation: possession = ownership = risk
of loss. Between the 13th and early 19th centuries, the simple equation was
changed. In the middle ages, the common method of transferring ownership was
livery of seisin, that is, delivery of possession. It is well-known that conveyances
of land required livery of seisin. Though it is not well-known now, the seisin
concept also applied for transfers of ownership of goods.39
Long before the 19th century, however, it had become possible to transfer
ownership of both land and goods through means other than delivery of pos-
session. The changes developed through different avenues for land and goods,
although the end results were quite similar.
For sales of land, it first became possible to carry out a land transfer through
delivery of a document of title, without the handing over of a clod of dirt. Though
that innovation originated within equity, the common law courts eventually
accepted it.4° By the late 18th century, equity had developed another innovation,
which came to be known as the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract. In
simplified form, this doctrine provided that upon the formation of a contract for
the sale of land, the buyer became, in the eyes of equity, the owner of the land,
though the delivery of the document of legal title and possession was not to occur
until later.
The equitable conversion doctrine appears to have been developed for two
reasons. First, equity used conversion when either buyer or seller died between
the time of contracting and the time of conveyance of legal title. For example,
because the English law of descent treated land and goods differently, it made a
great deal of difference whether a buyer of land died before or after gaining
ownership of the land. If the buyer died owning only personal property (the
36. BRACTON, DE LEcumus, Ch. XXVII, at 493 (Twiss ed., 1878); see also GLANVILLE, LAWS &
CusToMs (Cir. 1187-89) Book X, Ch. XIV, at 216 (Beames ed., 1900) ("The risk in respect of the thing
purchased and sold is generally on the party in possession, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.").
37. See Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 106.
38. SeeSTEpiIENM.LEAKE, DIGESTOFTHELAwoFPROPERTYINLAND, 303(1874). Early Roman-Civil
law was essentially the same as the Anglo-American law, treating land and goods alike, and holding that
ownership and risk passed with delivery of possession. See Geoffrey MaeCormack, Alfenus Varus and the Law
of Risk in Sale, 101 LAW. Q. REV. 573,577-86 (1985).
39. As to land, see THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 4.06(i)(2). As to goods, see James B. Ames, The
Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARv. L. REV. 23, 313, 337 (1889-90); SAMUEL WILLISTON, [A TIREATISE ON] THE
LAw OFCONTRACTS § 430, at 807 n.35 (1st ed. 1920) [hereinafter WILLISTON, CONTRACTSTREATISE].
40. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 21, § 11.1; THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 4.07(0(3).
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purchase price and a contractual right to purchase the land), one set of survivors
(the next of kin) would benefit. If the buyer died after gaining ownership of the
land, another set (the heirs) would benefit. Equity employed the equitable
conversion doctrine to treat the buyer as having gained ownership of the land,
even though the conveyance had not been completed, on the theory that this result
was most likely to reflect the intent of the decedent. 4
Second, treating the buyer as owner gave the buyer various protections not
otherwise available. With a recognized property interest in the land, rather than
a mere contractual right, the buyer had greater remedies against the seller and any
third parties who might threaten the land. The buyer could get the remedy of
specific performance. The buyer could even sell the property interest, in an era
when mere contract rights (choses in action) were not easily transferable.42
With the law courts slow to respond to these perceived needs, equity
intervened and developed the equitable conversion doctrine. By the beginning of
the 19th century, it could be said that, upon formation of a sale contract, without
awaiting conveyance recognized at law, or delivery of possession, the buyer of
land
by the contract has become in equity the owner of the premises, they are
his to all intents and purposes. They are vendible as his, chargeable as
his, capable of being incumbered as his; they may be devised as his, they
may be assets, and they would descend to his heir.43
The Chancellor was then asked how to allocate risk of loss in a case in which
there was a contract for sale, but the buyer had not yet received possession or a
conveyance of legal rifle. In 1801, in Paine v. Meller,44 the Chancellor combined
the ancient principle that risk goes with ownership with the new equitable
definition of ownership. The parties had agreed on the sale of a house, which then
burned before possession and the legal title were transferred. Paine came to stand
for the proposition that upon formation of a specifically enforceable contract for
sale of land, "any subsequent deterioration... of the property prima facie accrues
to the purchaser as owner; as a loss by fire, according to the maxim 'damnum ex
casu sentit dominus.'45
41. Conversion would also be used in case of a seller's death. See Flores, Comparison, supra note 2;
see generally, Sidney P. Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: , 44
YALE LJ. 559, 561 (1935).
42. See generally Simpson, supra note 41, at 580 (describing protections against third parties);
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 21, § 106; Hermann, supra note 21, at 7-9; AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 2, § 11.22.
43. Paine v. Melter, 6 Ves. Jun. 350,352,31 Eng. Rep. 1088, 1089 (Ch. 1801).
44. Id.
45. LEAKE, supra note 38; see Paine, 6 Ves. June at 352-53, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1089.
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The Chancellor, though adhering to the underlying theory for risk of loss
doctrine described by Bracton for the 13th century, had created a rule of nearly
opposite effect, shifting ownership and risk to the buyer despite the seller's
retention of possession. 6
The common law courts did not entirely accept the innovation of equitable
conversion. They continued to require more formal means of transfer of
ownership, and so it came to be that at the time of contracting, a buyer was
considered to have the equitable title, while the seller retained the legal title until
the conveyance was completed by delivery of a document of title.47 That
differentiation of equitable and legal title has continued until the present time.
Despite refusing to recognize a buyer under contract as owner at law, the law
courts did accept the risk of loss rule of Paine, and it became the rule of England.
The conversion doctrine, the splitting of legal and equitable title, and the Paine
rule were adopted by American courts by the end of the 19th century.48
Meanwhile the risk of loss doctrine in sales of goods was undergoing change
that would lead to a result much like the Paine rule. The change seems to have
been motivated by a desire to provide greater protection for a buyer under
contract, as against the seller and third parties. 9 The remedies available to one
with a mere contractual right as to goods were unsatisfactory. A buyer could best
be protected, given more satisfactory remedies, if the- buyer were viewed as
having a property interest, rather than a mere right in contract50
Although equity was not nearly so willing to intercede in matters of personal
property as in matters of real property,1 it did take some cases involving sales of
goods.52
Perhaps spurred on by the possibility of Chancery duplicating in goods sales
what it had done in land sales, or perhaps merely responding to the need to
protect buyers without such spurring, the courts of law developed a rule roughly
equivalent to the conversion doctrine. They held that at the time of formation of
46. Prior to Paine, equity had followed the rule of Stent v. Balis, 2 P. Wms. 217, 220, 24 Eng. Rep.
705, 706 (Ch. 1724) ("If I should buy an house, and before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the
same, the house be burnt down by casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay for the house .... ).
47. See Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. Jun. 265, 274, 32 Eng. Rep. 108, 111 (Ch. 1802) ("The effect of a
contract for purchase is very different at Law and in Equity. At Law the estate remains the estate of the vendor;
and the money that of the vendee. It is not so here. The estate from the sealing of the contract is the real
property of the vendee.").
48. See, e.g., Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301 (1869) (adopting Paine rule); see generally AMERICAN
LAW OFPROPERTY, supra note 2, § 11.30; Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 112-30.
49. See HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1, at 384.
50. Id.; see also SAMUEL WILLISTON, [TREATISE ON] THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 260, at 354 (1909) [hereinafter WILLISTON, SALES
TREATISE]; Ames, supra note 39.
51. See Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, supra note 8, at 873, 890-93.
52. In the few cases there were indications of equitable development of something like the doctrine of
equitable conversion for personal property, and something like the Paine rule to govern risk of loss. See
Williston, Common Law. supra note 6, at 107 n.3.
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a contract for sale, the buyer became, at law, the owner of the goods.53 In other
words, the "property" in or "title" toy4 the goods was transferred to the buyer at
the time of contracting, even if the seller still had possession. As owner, the buyer
acquired all of the benefits of ownership, including desirable remedies,55 as was
true for land sales under the conversion doctrine.
A quarter century after Chancery had developed the Paine rule, imposing the
risk of loss on the buyer of land as equitable owner at the time of contracting, the
law courts faced a parallel issue in sales of goods. In Tarling v. Baxter,56 the
parties had agreed on a sale of a haystack. The hay burned before the buyer
obtained possession. The court called on the ancient principle of ownership, that
",57
"the loss must fall upon him in whom the property was vested at the time....
It held that at the time of formation of the contract, though lacking actual
possession or the right to possession, the buyer had acquired the "property. 58
By the end of the 19th century American courts followed the underlying
theory and the specific rule of Tarling, with risk determined by ownership and
ownership passing upon formation of a contract, without transfer of possession. 59
Thus, at the close of the century American doctrines for risk of loss in sales of
land, and in sales of goods, though using somewhat different concepts of
ownership, were in both theory and specific results quite similar. For both, the
doctrine described by Bracton for the Middle Ages had been changed. The theory
remained that risk attended ownership, yet the rules for determining ownership
had changed. 60
53. See HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1, at 384.
54. In land sales, the existence of separate regimes of equity and law had led to the development of
separate concepts of equitable ownership and legal title. In goods sales, lacking the equitable terminology,
another kind of distinction was developed. The term "property" was used to refer to the status of ownership
as between the buyer and seller. The term 'title" was used to refer to the status of ownership with regard to
third parties. For reasons unimportant here, title and property were treated as distinct in some circumstances.
See Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561,
566 n.7 (1950) [hereinafter Williston, The Proposed Code].
55. See HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1, at 384. The change from the former requirement of
delivery of possession had occurred in steps. One intermediate step was to allow the desirable remedy of
detinue to a buyer who had paid the price but not yet taken delivery. Later, it was no longer necessary that the
buyer have paid the price to trigger the transfer of property. See generally WILLISTON, SALES TREATISE, supra
note 50, § 260, at 354.
56. 6 B & C 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Osbom v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654,660 (1871) ("[t]he question ... who shall bear the loss
occasioned by a vis major ... depends much upon the question, who was the proprietor when that loss was
occasioned ... the maxim applies, Res perit suo domino"). Osborn, though a case involving personal property,
relied on the realty case of Paine, for the general proposition that risk was tied.to ownership. Id.
60. Civil law had also changed by the 19th century. Whereas early Roman law had held that both
ownership and risk, for land or goods, passed only with delivery of possession, by the 19th century the Civil
law had developed a rule similar to the Paine rule for land and Tarling rule for goods, such that risk passed
at the time of formation of an enforceable contract for sale. The Civil law was more similar to the Paine rule
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Also at the close of the 19th century, American risk of loss law, for both land
and goods, was purely judge-made law. That was about to change for sales of
goods, and with that change, the paths of risk doctrine for land and goods were
to part for a time. In the 1890s, in both England and the United States, the bar saw
a need for codification of commercial law, including the law of sales of goods.
England moved first, codifying the common law of sales of goods in the English
Sale of Goods Act, effective in 1896.61 In America, it was first necessary to
establish an organization to develop uniform codes for the states and lobby for
their enactment. Energies were focussed on establishing such an institution, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, during the
1890s. 62 Immediately after the Conference was formed, the Commissioners went
to work on developing a statute for sales of goods. They brought the author of the
English Act to meet with the Conference to describe the English experience with
codification. 63 They elected to base an American statute on the English model and
enlisted Williston to modify it slightly to meet American circumstances, but
otherwise to follow the English Act as closely as possible, which he did.
4
In particular, the American statute, like the English Act, incorporated both the
ancient principle of basing risk of loss on ownership, and the early 19th century
Tarling rule, designating the buyer as the owner and risk-bearer immediately
upon formation of the sale agreement, regardless of possession of the goods.65
In 1906, the Commissioners approved that statute and recommended it to the
states as the Uniform Sales Act.6 The earliest products of the Conference did not
include the sort of extensive official commentary familiar in later uniform laws.
Instead, the Commissioners asked Williston to develop a treatise to accompany
the Sales Act, which he completed in 1909.67
than the Tarling rule, in that the Civil law did not hold that the Civil law equivalent of title passed at the time
of contracting, though the burden of risk, as an attribute of ownership, did pass at that time. See Williston, Civil
Law, supra note 6, at 72-73.
61. As to the history of the English Act, see Francis M. Burdick, Conditions and Warranties in the Sale
of Goods, I CoLriJ. L. REv. 71 (1901); William E. McCurdy, Uniformity and a Proposed Federal Sales Act,
26 VA. L. REV. 572,575 (1940).
62. The Conference was formally constituted in 1905. However, it had already been operating for a few
years on an informal basis, and in that period had promulgated one uniform act regarding negotiable
instruments. See McCurdy, supra note 61, at 574.
63. Id. at 575.
64. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAw 219 (1941) [hereinafter WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPIY];
McCurdy, supra note 61, at 575; HONNOLD, LAW OF SALES, supra note 1. at 385. Williston did make one
significant change from the English Act's treatment of risk of loss. He incorporated into the Sales Act a special
rule for so-called conditional sales transactions in which the buyer took possession although the seller explicitly
retained title for security purposes. See UNnI. SALES Acr § 22(a); WILLISTON, SALES TREATISE, supra note 50,
§§ 300-305, 334.
65. UNIF. SALES Acr §§ 19 (Rule 1), 22, 1 U.L.A. 15 (1950) (withdrawn 1951).
66. Id. at preface.
67. See ,VtILtISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 263; VLLISTON, SALES TREATISE, supra note
50, at iii.
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As Karl Llewellyn was later to write, the Sales Act was seen as an
"outstanding" achievement in modernizing the muddled and backward law that
preceded it.!' The Commissioners through their votes to recommend the Act
apparently agreed with that sentiment, and in particular with the Act's
preservation of the ownership theory and Tarling rule for risk allocation. The
majority of states seemingly agreed as well. Six jurisdictions adopted the Act
before Williston could even complete the accompanying treatise69 and eventually
34 jurisdictions did so.70 The organized bar was so pleased with the Sales Act that
in 1917 the bar prevailed upon Williston to develop a slightly modified version
to govern interstate sales, and submitted the modified version to Congress for
enactment as federal law!' The English Act was also widely copied in other
common law countries, including Canada. 2
Aside from its perceived benefits, codification of the risk of loss doctrine in
the Sales Act effectively froze the doctrine in place. It remained essentially
unchanged until the Sales Act was finally replaced by Article Two of the Code
beginning in the 1950s. For a half century the risk of loss doctrine in force as to
sales of goods was unaffected by numerous changes affecting commerce in
goods, and immune to the jurisprudential evolution already underway in the
doctrine of risk of loss in sales of land.
1. WILLISTON'S CAMPAIGN FOR REVOLUTION IN RISK OF Loss IN SALES OF
LAND: FROM PROPERTY TO CONTRACT AND A BIT BEYOND
A. Developments to the End of the 19th Century
At the time the ownership theory and Tarling rule for sales of goods had been
codified in England in the early 1890s, the ownership theory and Paine rule had
become well established in the United States. However, there had already been
one significant challenge to Paine in the United States, and developments were
underway in the law of contracts which opened an avenue for Williston to attack
Paine at the turn of the century.
The courts of Massachusetts rejected Paine, and initiated a minority rule, in
the 1838 case of Thompson v. Gould,73 and the 1871 case of Wells v. Calnan.4
In Thompson, the parties had agreed on the sale of a lot and house, but the deed
68. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 11, 37 COLIJM. L. REV. 341,381 (1937).
69. See WLus'roN, SALES TREATiSE, supra note 50, at iii.
70. See UNIF. SALES ACT, I U.L.A. 15, Table of Jurisdictions (1950).
71. The American Bar Association led the project. The bill was introduced in Congress in 1922, but
died without further action. See McCurdy, supra note 61, at 585-86.
72. See HONNOLD, LAw oF SALES, supra note 1, at 385.
73. 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 134 (1838).
74. 107 Mass. 514 (1871).
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had not been delivered when the house burned.75 Under Paine, the seller would
have been able to compel the buyer to go through with the sale, exchanging the
full price for the destroyed premises. The court rejected the Paine rule, and
treated the sale arrangement as canceled, effectively leaving the loss on the seller.
The court used two interrelated rationales. First, simply applying the ownership
principle, it treated legal title, not equitable title, as the appropriate test of
ownership for purposes of risk of loss. The court referred to the English cases
prior to Paine, and to the then-current law as to sales of goods, as support for
using legal title. Second, the court made use of a doctrine of contract law, failure
of consideration. The theory, though not very clearly stated in the early case, was
that the seller's inability to provide the promised realty eliminated the basis for
enforcement of the buyer's promise to pay.
In Wells, a house under contract for sale burned before the deed was
delivered. Again the court effectively imposed the risk on the seller by refusing
to enforce the buyer's obligation to pay. The court repeated the first rationale
from Thompson, that the seller, as holder of legal title, was the owner for
purposes of risk of loss. In that sense, the decision was based on the law of
property. This time the court elaborated on the second rationale from Thompson,
failure of consideration. The court found support in two English cases. In the first,
Bacon v. Simpson,76 the holder of a leasehold on a furnished residence had agreed
to assign the remaining term. Before the assignee could take possession, the
residence burned. The assignor sought payment. The Court of Exchequer held
that the assignor "could not have completed the contract.., for it was impossible
for her to do so," and therefore could not maintain the action for payment by the
assignee-tenant."
The second English case was the now famous 1863 decision of Taylor v.
Caldwell.78 In Taylor, the parties had agreed on the hire of a music hall for a few
days time. The hall burned after the agreement was made, but before the agreed
date for the hall to be put to use. As all contract law students now know, the
Taylor court's main holding was that the destruction of the hall excused the
owner from the obligation to provide the use of the hall. The Taylor court rea-
soned that the parties had contracted on the basis of a mutual assumption that the
hall would be in existence, and so their agreement had an implied condition that
the owner would be excused if the hall no longer existed. The Taylor court also
stated that the same implied condition applied to the obligation to pay for the use
of the hall, holding that "the music hall having ceased to exist, without fault of
75. The buyer had already paid the price, and after the destruction the case was presented in the form
of a suit by the buyer seeking return of the money paid. Thompson, 37 Mass. at 136.
76. 3M. &W. 78, 150Eng. Rep. 1064(Ex. 1837).
77. Id. at 89-90, 150 Eng. Rep. at 1069.
78. 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
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either party, both parties are excused, the plaintiffs from.., paying the money,
the defendants from performing their promise to give the use of the hall....,79
The Massachusetts court used Taylor and the Bacon case for the rationale that
the occurrence of the fire prevented the seller from performing, and so in turn
excused the buyer from the obligation to buy,80 and used the Taylor way of
framing that rationale; that the parties had implicitly agreed that destruction of the
premises before the sale would cancel the arrangement !'
The Massachusetts doctrine, as it came to be known, could be viewed as
having two aspects. First, it could be seen as carrying on, without question, the
ancient principle of basing risk of loss on ownership. In that sense the
Massachusetts cases differed from Paine only in that Paine used the definition of
ownership recognized in equity, whereas the Massachusetts cases used the
definition recognized in courts of law, i.e., legal title. The rule then, was that risk
did not pass until there was a completed conveyance of legal title, usually by
delivery of a deed.
However, by bringing the Taylor doctrine into its analysis, the Massachusetts
court opened another avenue for risk of loss issues. Whereas risk of loss had pre-
viously been approached purely as a matter of the law of property, with
ownership the critical issue, the Massachusetts cases moved in the direction of
taking contract doctrine into account. The body of law now known as contract
had not existed in the medieval era when Bracton wrote, and was only coming to
be recognized as a distinct body of law as of the early 19th century, when Paine
was decided. With the Wells decision in 1873, the Massachusefs court, using the
excuse doctrine recently clarified in Taylor, opened the way for more important
roles in risk of loss law for the emerging law of contract. Although the
Massachusetts doctrine attracted only a small minority following in comparison
with the majority Paine rule as of the turn of the century,82 it did open a line of
development of which Williston would make much use.
Williston entered the field of risk of loss in sales of land with a set of articles
in 1895. With those articles he began a campaign to change the law. He continued
that campaign with a 1920 treatise, the 1932 Restatement (First) of Contracts, and
the 1935 Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. He began the campaign with
a clear sense that the Paine rule led to bad results, and a vague sense that the
underlying theory of ownership was troubled. He remained committed to the goal
79. A. Had Taylor involved the sale of a fee interest the Taylor holding would of course have been seen
as directly stating a rule of risk of loss. In effect it did impose on the owner the risk of loss of the rental value
of the hall for the agreed period. Taylor has not generally been recognized as a risk of loss case, and is not cited
in treatments of risk of loss in sales of land. That presumably is so because rather than a fee interest (i.e., a
property interest), Taylor involved a mere temporary hiring, which would probably be classified as a mere
license (i.e., a mere contract right).
80. Wells, 107 Mass. at 518.
81. Id.; see also Libman v. Levenson, 128 N.E. 13 (Mass. 1920).
82. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 60 N.H. 352 (1880); Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879).
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of replacing Paine, but at each stage in the forty year campaign his thinking about
the underlying theory evolved away from ownership (property law), and toward
alternatives, most prominently theories based on doctrines of contract law.
B. Williston's 1895 Articles on Risk of Loss: The First Stage of the
Campaign
The opening stage in Williston's campaign was a pair of articles he published
in 1895, addressing risk of loss in both common law and civil law traditions, for
both land and goods sales: The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale
in the Civil Law and The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the
Common Law.8 3 Williston made clear that his motivation for publishing the
articles, and indeed for continuing the campaign in later years, was his conclusion
that it was unjust to impose risk on a land buyer who had not yet obtained
possession, as the Paine rule did. He felt that risk should remain with the seller
so long as the seller retained possession. In other words, it was the result of
Paine, not the underlying theory of basing risk on ownership that initially
troubled him.84
In the 1895 articles he mounted a number of attacks on Paine. One line of
attack was to pit the conversion doctrine, using equitable title as the test of
ownership, against rules treating legal title as ownership for purposes of risk of
loss. Thus, he showed that Paine was inconsistent with the accepted common law
doctrine for sales of goods, relying on legal title.8 And he devoted one of the two
articles to a comprehensive study of the Civil Law, to show that Paine was
inconsistent with the then-modem Civil Law, which imposed risk on the seller
until conveyance of the Civil Law equivalent of legal title, in both land and goods
sales.86
He also argued that Paine was inconsistent with what he saw as the trend rule
in leasehold cases. The Bacon case used by the Wells court declined to enforce
a lease agreement against a tenant in circumstances in which the premises burned
before the tenant took possession.87 In cases in which premises were destroyed
after a tenant took possession, the English rule had been to enforce the tenant's
obligation to pay rent despite the destruction, on the theory that the tenant put in
83. Williston, Civil Law, supra note 6; Williston, Common Law, supra note 6.
84. WuLLSTON, AUToBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 259. Williston has not been alone in that sense of
what is just. The authors of the Cunningham Property treatise have reported that students in their courses
typically find the Paine rule counter-intuitive. See CuNNiNGHAmErAL, supra note 21, at 741 n.27. This author
has found similar sentiments among lay persons, law students, and lawyers.
85. See Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 106, 111.
86. Williston, Civil Law, supra note 6, at 76-77. Williston did observe that before the 19th century,
Civil law had used a rule effectively equivalent to Paine. He examined and undercut each of the arguments that
had been forwarded to support that rule before it was overturned. Id.
87. Wells, 107 Mass. at 516; see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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possession had obtained the legal estate for which the tenant had bargained!'
However, by the late 19th century, some American courts had come to favor
relieving a tenant in such circumstances8 9 Williston saw this as the trend in
leasehold law, and argued that it seemed particularly unjust to impose risk on a
land buyer who had never taken possession, while relieving a tenant who had at
least been put in possession before the casualty.90
Williston's most direct attack on Paine was a challenge to the underlying
assumption of the conversion doctrine, the notion that a buyer under contract,
with equitable ownership, should be treated as owner for purposes of risk of loss.
He conceded that the buyer had been given significant attributes of ownership,
including protection against the seller and against third parties. 9'Williston argued,
however, that one of two most important attributes of ownership was the right of
present enjoyment. 92 He showed that it was undisputed that a buyer under contract
of sale, not having taken legal title by deed, had no right to possession of the land,
nor to take rents and profits of the land, unless the parties had explicitly agreed
otherwise.93 The Paine decision had ignored that fundamental aspect of
ownership. Williston argued this as a fatal blow to the foundation of Paine, as the
seller, not the buyer had the right of present enjoyment while the contract was
executory. With the right of possession as well as legal title, the seller was more
nearly the owner.
Williston also looked at land sale contract arrangements in which the parties
did explicitly agree that the buyer could take possession and/or rents and profits,
while the seller retained legal title. In such arrangements, he argued that the
seller's legal title was nothing more than a security interest, comparable to a
mortgagee's interest and lacking in other significant attributes of ownership. In
such cases he argued that the buyer, with equitable title and the right of present
enjoyment, was more nearly the owner and should be treated as such for purposes
of risk.
Williston thus took on both the majority Paine rule which used equitable title
alone as the measure of ownership for risk of loss, and the minority rule of the
88. Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 125-27.
89. See id. at 127-29.
90. Id. at 129.
91. Since the time of Bracton, the buyer had, through the intercession of equity, gotten protection as
against the seller, particularly with the right of specific performance. See Williston, Common Law, supra note
6, at 113. Through laws allowing recording of land sale contracts, the buyer had gotten protection against third
parties. See id. The buyer's rights under a land sale contract had come to be assignable. See id. at 119
(describing the right to dispose of the property).
Williston also acknowledged the utility of applying the theory of equitable conversion to have the buyer's
interest descend as land should the buyer die before the contract was carried out. However, he dismissed that
as merely carrying out the intentions of the buyer at death, and affecting only the relationships among the
buyer's survivors, and thus not relevant to the relationship of the buyer and seller. See id. at 116-17.
92. Id. at 119.
93. Id. at 123-24.
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Massachusetts cases, which used legal title alone as the measure. He proposed a
third rule, based on possession. In his view, the buyer with both equitable title and
possession, or the seller with both legal title and possession, should be treated as
the "substantial" owner and made to bear the risk of loss.
In the process of arguing against Paine and for its replacement in the 1895
articles, Williston began to challenge the underlying theory of risk of loss
doctrine. He demonstrated that ownership was no longer a reliable basis for
assigning risk, because in then-current sale arrangements, the attributes of
ownership tended to be split up. He argued that risk allocation should be
approached not as a question of identifying one party as owner (property law), but
through principles of contract. He added that a rule which satisfied the primary
concern of being in accord with contract principles could also, secondarily, be
judged by its "practical advantage" as to insurance and loss prevention.
1. From property
In the medieval era of which Bracton wrote, a rule of risk based on ownership
made sense because all of the attributes of ownership passed in one neat
transaction with the transfer of possession (and ceremonial handing over of a clod
of dirt). Until the transfer of possession (and livery of seisin), the would-be buyer
had no recognized property interest, and afterward the seller had lost all property
interests. With the recognition of transfers of ownership by deed, the English had
allowed at least temporary splitting of possession and other attributes of
ownership as represented in the concept of legal title. In response to the perceived
need to treat a buyer as owner for purposes other than risk of loss, equity had
developed the conversion doctrine. By the time of Paine, the English had allowed
ownership to be split into legal title, equitable title, and possession.
In the process of arguing against both the Paine rule (equitable title alone)
and the Massachusetts rule (legal title alone) Williston effectively demonstrated
that in sale arrangements of his era, the various attributes of ownership were often
split between the parties, and shifted over time. That analysis demonstrated the
difficulties of defining either buyer or seller as owner in the midst of a sale
transaction. Add to that the fact that equity and the law courts were operating
under opposing definitions of ownership, and it became apparent that basing risk
of loss on ownership had become a highly questionable policy by the late 19th
century.
Williston did not explicitly conclude that the difficulties of identifying one
party as the owner made it untenable to allocate risk of loss on status of
ownership in the midst of a sale. However, he did argue, significantly, that
determining ownership, i.e, applying the law of property, should no longer serve
as the primary way to approach risk of loss issues. Instead, the primary role
should be given principles of contract law.
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In determining the propriety of throwing the risk on the purchaser from
the date of the contract, the primary question is not, it should be
observed, whether the vendor or the vendee may be called owner with
the greater propriety pending performance of the contract, still less
whether the vendee may be called owner in equity and the vendor a
trustee .... [Rather, the focus should be on principles of] the law of
contracts...94
2. To contract
Williston devoted extensive attention to the prospect of using principles of
contract law to guide risk of loss decisions. The full import of his turn away from
property and to contract is somewhat difficult to grasp, just as the full import of
the role of contract principles in the Uniform Commercial Code has proven
difficult for modern-day scholars to grasp. The difficulty stems in part from the
fact that there are multiple principles in the body of contract law that Williston
found relevant to risk in land sales and that are relevant today in sales of goods.
Contract law had already come to affect land-sale risk of loss decisions as of
the time Williston wrote. The clearest example was the willingness of courts to
enforce a specific clause in the contract for sale by which risk of loss would be
allocated to one party even if that party would not otherwise be considered to be
the owner. Williston posited that "[i]t would be universally admitted that, if the
contract expressly provided that the risk should be with one party or the other,
this provision would be of controlling force."95 While he had no examples of
clauses explicitly referring to the risk of loss as such, he did cite the example of
a clause by which the seller expressly promised to deliver the premises in good
condition. In one case the court held that such a clause effectively shifted the risk
to the seller, as the seller's failure to perform on that "good condition" obligation
prevented enforcement of the buyer's promise to pay. 6
Williston next noted precedent to the effect that one party's delay in
performance would affect the allocation of risk. While the then controlling rule
of Paine would otherwise put risk on the buyer as equitable owner, that rule
would not apply if at the time of the loss the seller had been in "default." 97 From
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Id. at 120; see generally Flores, Comparison, supra note 2, at 338-41.
96. Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 115.
97. See id Williston used Paine itself as an example. In Paine the seller had been obligated to have the
title to the realty clear and marketable by a certain date. The seller had apparently failed to perform on that
obligation, but there was also some indication that the buyer may have waived the default. After pronouncing
the rule for which Paine came to be known (risk on the buyer from the time of contracting), the Chancellor
remanded the case for further fact finding on the issues of default and waiver. Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jun. 350.
353,31 Eng. Rep., 1088, 1090 (Ch. 1801); see also Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 115.
Williston observed a similar default-based rule in his study of Civil law. In that setting, he observed that
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that established base, Williston moved to build upon the role of contract doctrine
in risk allocation, approving of and elaborating upon the avenue of contract-
oriented thinking opened by the Massachusetts court, and then moving to entirely
new ground.
The contract-oriented approach begun by the Massachusetts courts rose in
part from the doctrine of mutual dependency of promises. The buyer's obligation
to pay was dependent on performance of the seller's obligation to convey and
deliver. That doctrine Williston saw as not having been well established in
contract law until nearly the 19th century, which led him to suggest that there was
little value in examining earlier risk of loss cases?' With the 1863 Taylor v.
Caldwell decision, Williston urged that it had come to be a "fundamental
principle of the law of contracts-a principle founded on natural justice" that the
buyer could not be compelled to perform the promise to pay unless the seller at
least substantially performed the counter promise 9 He expressed that principle
in the way that it was then viewed in the still maturing body of contract law,
describing it as based on a theory of "implied conditions" and "failure of
consideration." t°°
In his view, Paine, older than Taylor by some sixty years, violated that
recently recognized fundamental principle. The seller's counter promise was to
convey and deliver all of the benefits of ownership. The benefits conferred on the
buyer through application of the doctrines of equity at the time of contracting,
lacking the critically important right of present enjoyment, did not amount to
substantial performance of the seller's promise. 1't Only when possession also had
been transferred could it be said that the seller had substantially performed, and
only then could the buyer's counter promise to pay the price be enforced. If the
doctrine of excuse by impossibility, for which Taylor was coming to be known,
worked to excuse the seller, it should necessarily excuse the buyer, as well.
10 2
one party's delay in performance, known as "mora" in the Latin, also affected allocation of risk. See Williston,
Civil Law, supra note 6, at 74.
As a separate matter, Williston observed the established doctrine in Anglo-American law basing
allocation of loss on proven fault in causing the loss. The loss ordinarily falling on the buyer under Paine
would be shifted to the seller if the loss resulted from the seller's "own negligence." Williston, Common Law,
supra note 6, at 115. See generally Flores, Comparison, supra note 2. at 325-31 (discussing the role that both
default and causal fault may play in allocation of loss).
98. See Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 106 n.2 ("[Olnly modem decisions have much value"
because "the dependency of mutual promises in any executory bilateral contract was little understood before
the present century."). Although he expressed that sentiment in the context of examining the law as to sales
of goods, it is apparent he thought it applied to sales of land as well, because he looked no further into the past
than Paine. He later made clear in his 1920 Contracts Treatise that he intended the sentiment to apply to land
as well as goods. See infra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
99. Williston, Common Law, supra note 6. at 118-19.
100. Id. at 115.
101. Id. at 119.
102. Id.
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Williston then combined his Taylor analysis with the existing precedent
holding that the buyer's promise could not be enforced if the seller had explicitly
agreed to deliver the premises in good condition. In his view the express promise
was unnecessary because, implicitly, a seller's "promise to convey must always
mean a promise to convey in substantially the same condition as at the time of the
contract."103 The doctrine applicable in cases of express promises should logically
be extended to all cases, and would inevitably lead to destruction of the Paine
rule."°
Williston then moved into new territory, addressing the core of classical
contract law: finding and carrying out the intention of the parties. He argued that
"the chief factor in any proper decision" as to risk of loss should be the "intention
of the parties" on the precise question of whether "the risk should be with one
party or the other."1 5 Enforcing an explicit agreement as to risk allocation was,
of course, "universally" accepted.'0 6 In the many cases lacking such explicit
provisions, there had to be a way to come as close as possible to finding and
carrying out the parties' intent on that precise question. Williston came up with
such a way, by using the ancient notion that risk belonged with ownership.
However, he used it far differently than it had been used before, turning it into a
factor to consider in applying contract doctrine, rather than a maxim of property
law dictating an inevitable outcome of risk allocation.
He argued that the parties' intent as to risk allocation could be determined
through finding their intent as to the transfer of ownership. Their agreement as to
the point of transfer of ownership would serve as a proxy. It would work because
ordinarily the parties could be assumed to view risk as an incident of ownership,
and to expect that risk would pass with ownership. However, it would work only
if the focus were on substantial ownership, encompassing the crucial "beneficial
incidents" of ownership, as most clearly represented by possession. Neither
equitable title without possession, nor legal title without possession, could
accurately serve that proxy role.'07
Williston tested the Paine rule by this new standard of carrying out the intent
of the parties, and found it failed. In a typical transaction in which the parties
agreed to have legal title and possession transferred at some date well after the
formation of the contract, one could assume they intended to have the substantial
ownership and thus risk pass at that later date. The Paine rule violated that intent
103. Id. at 114.
104. l
105. Id. at 120.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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by proceeding as if they had intended ownership and risk to pass earlier. lo Paine
converted an agreement for a future transfer into a present transfer.1t 9
Williston also tested the legal-title rule used in the Massachusetts cases and
found it failed his intent test. In cases in which the parties agreed on an immediate
transfer of possession, with the seller to retain legal title pending payment, the
retained legal title was intended to serve merely as a security interest, like that of
a mortgagee. Leaving risk on the seller merely because the seller had yet to
transfer legal title would violate the parties' presumed intent to have risk pass
along with the "beneficial incidents" of possession.ttu That nile converted an
agreement for a present transfer into a future transfer.
Williston concluded that portion of his analysis by clearly restating risk issues
as issues to be decided first and foremost through contract doctrine. A land sale
arrangement was a contract, and should be treated as such.' "[I]n dealing with
contracts no general rule can be more just than to aim to follow the intention of
the parties, and therefore to throw the loss on the vendee if the parties intend a
present transfer, on the vendor if they intend a future transfer."' 2
From at least the time of Bracton through the time of Paine, the courts had
approached risk of loss issues predominantly, perhaps even exclusively, through
principles of property. In the mid-19th century Massachusetts cases, property
thinking remained important, perhaps dominant, but a place was being made for
108. Id. at 120-21.
109. From that perspective, he argued that Paine would be wrong even if equitable intercession did give
the buyer substantial ownership as of the time of contracting. The parties did not agree to a present transfer.
Imposing on them a present transfer, in place of the future transfer they contemplated, would run contrary to
the core principle of contract law. See id. at 118-20.
110. Id. at 109-10.
111. Williston further emphasized this point in his use of the analogy of leasehold law. As previously
noted, the American trend rule favored relieving a tenant from the obligation to pay rent after destruction of
the leased premises. The former rule had denied relief to the tenant who took possession before the destruction,
reasoning that the conveyance had been completed with the transfer of possession, and the tenant was the
owner of the premises during the term of the lease. See id. at 127-29. Williston observed that the trend rule
relieving the tenant was based in part on the growing understanding that parties to a modem lease transaction
were "apt to regard it rather as a contract than as a conveyance." Id. at 129. From that base he argued that an
executory contract for the sale of land, prior to transfer of possession, was also more contract than conveyance,
and so the buyer should be given the same protection given a tenant under the trend rule. He cited one example
involving a lease of such long term that it was practically an absolute conveyance. The court would have
applied the Paine rule had it been a contract for a fee, but relieved the tenant because it was technically a lease.
See id. at 128 n.2, 129.
As followers of modem landlord-tenant law are aware, the trend Williston observed has strengthened over
the century since he wrote. Courts, and many states through legislation, have adopted rules canceling
leaseholds in the event of accidental destruction of the premises. In some cases the trend rule has been
fashioned as an application of the principle of Taylor v. Caldwell, excuse by impossibility. See, e.g., Albert
M. Greenfield & Co. v. Kolea, 380 A.2d 758 (Pa. 1977). The trend rule has been recognized as "one outgrowth
of the move from property to contract currently underway in landlord-tenant law." JESSE DUKEMINtER & JAMES
E. KRER, PROPERTY 424 (2d ed. 1988). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF PROPERTY, §§ 5.3, 5.4 (1977
& Supp. 1995).
112. Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 121.
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contract thinking. Williston put forward an analytical scheme with contract
thinking as its primary feature, relegating property thinking to a subsidiary role.
The concept of ownership was to serve only as a means of finding the fact
(intention) needed for a proper contract-oriented analysis.
3. And a bit beyond
Having shifted the focus from property principles to contract principles,
Williston then added a third set of principles. He argued that any rule for risk
allocation, in addition to meeting the primary test of compliance with contract
principles, should also pass the test of "practical advantage."" 3 He identified three
such practical considerations, and asserted that his proposed rule of transferring
risk with possession best served each consideration.
Perhaps most important of the three was "the consideration that it is wiser to
have the party in possession of property care for it at his peril, rather than at the
peril of another."'"t 4 Giving the party in possession a "great personal stake" would
induce that party to take care of the premises, even more effectively than the
existing doctrine that imposed a loss on the party proven to have negligently
caused the loss." 5
Less important was the consideration that "it is better in a doubtful case to let
a loss lie where it falls. It saves litigation."' 6 Putting risk on the party in
possession, using Williston's proposed rule, would effectively leave any loss
where it fell."
7
Finally, as a "further consideration" Williston referred to the "arrangement
of the insurance."' He argued that by putting risk on the buyer immediately
upon formation of the contract, the Paine rule "practically removes it from an
insurer. ... ,,"9 Under then current insurance law and practices, the buyer could
113. Id.
114. Id. at 122.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Although Williston did not say so, his rule using possession as the test would also save litigation,
and otherwise serve the goal today known as efficiency, by providing certainty. Just as livery of seisin had once
served to make abundantly clear to all concerned that a transfer of ownership had occurred, so would
Williston's rule allow the parties to have an unmistakably concrete event to signal the transfer of risk.
In his study of Civil law, Williston went further in explaining how a rule effectively equivalent to the
Paine rule would generate, rather than save litigation, and create other practical disadvantages. A seller holding
possession and legal title might (intentionally or inadvertently) purport to contract with two or more
prospective buyers for sale of the same property. In Civil law countries which once followed the rule equivalent
to Paine, allocating the risk in such situations had been addressed through a wide variety of rules, such that
a contract might be enforced against and risk imposed on the first buyer only, the second buyer only, neither
buyer, or the buyer arbitrarily elected by the seller. Williston observed that allocating risk in such successive
agreement cases had become a "favorite matter of dispute. . .- Williston, Civil Law, supra note 6, at 77.
118. Williston, Common Law, supra note 6, at 122.
119. Id.
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not obtain insurance coverage until after the contract was formed, because the
buyer would have no insurable interest until then. Any insurance coverage
previously obtained by the seller might in effect be canceled by application of the
Paine rule, because the effect of Paine was to declare the buyer the owner, and
thus change the seller's interest in the property.'2' In his view, it was desirable to
maximize the likelihood of having the property insured, and that could best be
accomplished by leaving risk on the seller, in light of the fact that the seller
"ordinarily has insurance at the time of the contract."' 2'
Williston cited no cases or works of other scholars for the proposition that
such practical considerations ought to have a role in formulation of risk of loss
doctrine. There is no evidence of such thinking in the cases prior to 1895,
certainly not in Paine itself, nor even in the Massachusetts cases. Until Williston
entered the field, the sort of practical considerations he raised had not been given
significant attention in risk of loss law.'2
With the 1895 articles, Williston had set the course that he would follow in
his 40 year campaign for reform. He set out to advocate replacing the majority
Paine equitable title rule, and the minority Massachusetts legal title rule with a
rule using possession as the test. He did that. And in the process he began to
advocate for changes in the underlying theory. He forcefully argued that
principles of contract law be given the dominant role in formulating risk of loss
doctrine, with a subservient role for the formerly all-important principles of
property and an additional supporting role for the newly identified practical
considerations, including loss prevention and insurance maximization.
4. The early responses
The reception given Williston's work by courts and scholars in the years
following 1895 made clear that it would be a long and difficult campaign for
reform. Two prime examples of that reception came in 1901. Williston's former
contracts teacher and then colleague, William Keener, published a defense of
Paine and severe criticism of many of Williston's arguments for the possession
rule.'2 Keener focussed on the principle of ownership as the only basis on which
120. See id. at 122-23.
121. Id. at 122.
122. Williston later characterized his focus on such as matters as a concern with "practical justice,"
which he distinguished from "technical legal reasoning." WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64. This
facet of Williston's contributions to the law seems to have been overlooked by the critics from later
generations, including Llewellyn, who have derided Williston as a hidebound rigid-thinking conceptualist. See
i at 214 ("I am a realist, though not so called by the group that have adopted the designation."); see generally
Daniel J. Mrau, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV.
511 (1990).
123. William A. Keener, The Burden of Loss as an Incident of the Right to the Specific Performance of
a Contract, I COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1901). The vigor of Keener's response to Williston may have had something
to do with their relationship. Keener had been Williston's contracts teacher at Harvard. See WILLISTON,
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risk should be allocated. He defended the Paine equitable title rule as a proper
application of the ownership principle by mustering the various equitable
doctrines that Paine had relied on in holding that a buyer under contract, even
without possession, had the important attributes of ownership. 24
He called upon the analogy of the common law mortgage, as treated by equity
at the turn of the century. In a mortgage transaction, the mortgagee held legal
title, but through the intervention of equity over the years, the mortgagor had
come to have equitable protection, including the equity of redemption, and so had
come to be seen as having equitable ownership. In mortgage law the risk of loss
lay on the mortgagor. Keener equated a buyer under contract as having ownership
rights similar to a mortgagor, and so argued it was appropriate to also impose the
risk of loss on the buyer."z
Keener even defended the Wells legal title rule. Because Wells issued from
a common law court, and at common law the holder of legal title was viewed as
owner, Keener asserted that under the controlling principle of ownership, the
common law courts not only could but must leave risk on the seller until
conveyance of legal title. 26
As to Williston's attempt to overcome Paine by refocussing the inquiry away
from ownership and into contract principles, Keener dismissed the contract
principles as matters of common law. Equity, he wrote, had developed the Paine
rule using the law of trusts, and should continue to follow that road undeterred by
the common law of contracts. 27
Keener grudgingly recognized some value to Williston's creation of a role for
practical considerations, such as loss prevention and insurance coverage, but
declared them insufficiently important to overcome the weight of the ownership
principle.'2 He concluded that the established doctrine had to stand because it
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 74. Keener left the Harvard faculty because of a dispute over salary just
at the time Williston was hired. Id. at 130.
124. Keener, supra note 123, at 3-4.
125. l. at4.
126. Id. at 1. Keener seemed not at all bothered by the prospect of having directly opposing risk of loss
results reached at law and in equity.
127. Id. at 3, 6. Where Williston approached risk allocation with the notion that the "intention of the
parties is the chief factor in any proper decision," Williston. Common Law, supra note 6, at 120, Keener
approached the issue from the perspective that the buyer, even without the right of possession "has been given
in equity... substantially the benefits of equitable ownership. As a necessary consequence ... he must bear,
as one of the burdens of ownership, the loss involved in the destruction of property .... Keener, supra note
123, at 10.
128. Keener, supra note 123, at 9-10.
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was not "possible to reach any other result." 29 Keener carried great weight 13°and
his response foretold a difficult road ahead for Williston's reforms.' 3'
In the same year that Keener wrote, the courts' response to Williston was
signalled by a Maryland decision, Skinner & Sons' Co. v. Houghton. '32 The court
ignored Williston's reform efforts and reaffirmed the Paine rule. 33 In the ensuing
two decades, with few exceptions,'tM the courts continued to follow Paine and
reject Williston's proposal. 35 In Massachusetts, the court continued to follow the
line it had set out in Thompson and Wells.
36
C. Williston's 1920 Contracts Treatise: The Second Stage of the Campaign
Williston returned 37 to the campaign in 1920, with his landmark treatise on
contract law published that year. 38 He included in the massive treatise a separate
chapter on sales of land, and devoted much of the chapter to risk of lOSS. 39 He
129. Id. at 1.
130. Keener was the Dean of the Columbia Law School, and a prominent scholar in equity. See
WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 74; Keener, supra note 123, at I (referring to his equity
casebook). He was equally prominent in contract law, having taught in the field and even having taught
Williston. See WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra, at 75. He presented his article prominently as the lead
article in the first issue of the Columbia Law Review.
131. Harvard's Dean Pound joined the rejection of Williston's efforts. He argued that "[pjossession is
not material with respect to the passing or existence of either legal or equitable title to land. Why then should
it be material as to the incidents of equitable title" such as risk? He also faulted the possession test for having
no basis in case law. Paine, on the other hand was both theoretically sound on the principle of ownership and
had the weight of authority. Roscoe Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918.19: Equity (Continued), 33 HARV.
L. REv. 813, 826 n.68 (1920). Pound's influential views were carried further through one of the period's most
important treatises on property law. See I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 460 (2d ed. 1940).
132. 48 A. 85 (Md. 1900).
133. Skinner was treated in student notes at Notes, I COLuM. L. REV. 311 (1901); 1 COLUM. L. REV. 313
(1901).
134. The exceptions questioning or outright rejecting Paine included Good v. Jarrard, 76 S.E. 698 (S.C.
1912); Conlin v. Osborne, 120 P. 755 (Cal. 1911); La Chance v. Brown, 183 P. 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
135. See generally Morris Karon, Note, Vendor and Purchaser: Risk of Loss, 2 Wis. L. REv. 174 (1923)
(surveying cases).
136. See Libman v. Levenson, 128 N.E. 13 (Mass. 1920); Hawkes v. Kehoe, 79 N.E. 766, (Mass. 1907);
Kares v. Covell, 62 N.E. 244 (Mass. 1902). Libman attracted sufficient attention to merit its being treated in
W.S.R., Annotation, Who Must Bear Loss Due to Destruction or Deterioration of Real Property Pending
Contract for Its Conveyance, 22 A.L.R. 560 (1920), and came to be cited by most scholars studying risk of loss
in land sales through the remainder of the 20th century.
137. Williston had actually made another contribution to the field before 1920. In his 1904 Contracts
casebook he included a small treatment of risk of loss. The section consisted solely of the Wells case,
presenting the Massachusetts contract-influenced approach to risk. He made no mention of Paine. Perhaps that
choice of cases was a simple statement about the lack of evidence of contract law influence in Paine. See
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A SELECTION ON CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS 73-77 (1904).
138. See WLLimSTON, CONTRACTS TREATISE, supra note 39.
139. Id. §§ 927-954.
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repeated, and enlarged and sharpened the points made in the 1895 articles, with
many of the changes obviously being in response to Keener's article."40
The focus, again, was to have his possession rule replace the majority Paine
rule, and less importantly the minority Massachusetts rule. 141 Again he demon-
strated that the rule of Paine imposing risk on the buyer was inconsistent with the
trend in modem civil law, and the trend in American landlord-tenant law, both of
which had grown stronger since 1895.42
With renewed vigor he challenged the assumption of Paine that a buyer,
lacking possession, could be considered to have substantial ownership. 43 In that
vein he added a response to Keener's attempt to justify Paine through analogy to
mortgage law. Keener had argued that a buyer under contract was in a position
equivalent to a mortgagor, and so should similarly bear the risk of loss. Williston
found the analogy untenable because the mortgagor had the right of possession,
and the contract buyer did not except by special agreement.'"
Williston offered a more apt analogy. A buyer under contract was in many
ways in a position similar to the holder of an option to buy. Each had rights
against the giver of the option, rights against interference by third parties, and the
right to assign the option, but no right to possession. The option holder under no
circumstances was held to bear the risk of loss, as even Keener had to admit. 45
Summing up, he added to his attack on the equitable title rule of Paine a
nicely turned phrase that would later catch on with scholars and courts. Of the
maxim that the buyer under contract, though lacking possession, was the owner
and the seller was merely a trustee of the legal title, Williston wrote, "[o]nly the
hoary age and frequent repetition of the maxim prevents a general recognition of
its absurdity."' 46
Even so, Williston had not concluded that ownership was an unworkable
basis for allocating risk of loss. On the one hand, his analyses in challenging both
Paine and the legal title rule demonstrated a growing understanding that in the
140. See id. § 930 (citing Keener).
141. See id. § 940.
142. See id. §§ 947-954 (discussing the civil law ); see id. §§ 944-946 (elaborating upon landlord-tenant
law).
143. See id. §§ 927-931,936-938.
144. See id. § 937. Williston observed two other flaws in Keener's analogy. First, in mortgage law, a
mortgagee was not liable for payment of taxes. A seller under contract who retained possession was expected
to pay taxes. Second, there was the matter of equity of redemption. In mortgage law, equity had long since
intervened to prevent forfeitures of a mortgagor's interest, by prohibiting strict enforcement of forfeiture
clauses. Thus the concept known today as equity of redemption had been developed. Equity offered no such
protection for a buyer under contract, and would not intervene to prevent strict enforcement of forfeiture
provisions in contracts for the sale of land. See id. Of course there is today a move to provide protections
against forfeiture similar to the equity of redemption for buyers under long term installment land contracts. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (Tm) OF PROPERTY § 3.4 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992).
145. See WILLISTON, CoNTRACrS TREATIsE, supra note 39, § 936; Keener, supra note 123, at 2.
146. WmLsTroN, CoNTRAcrs TREATsE, supra note 39, § 929.
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midst of a sale transaction the attributes of ownership were ordinarily split and
shifting between seller and buyer. He recognized that at any given time, each
party had substantial rights, both equitable and legal in nature. 47 On the other
hand, in the treatise he added a statement not made in 1895:
The principle that risk attends ownership might conceivably be contested,
but it is not, and though if that principle is understood as necessarily
throwing the risk where the technical legal title lies, it is open to
criticism; it is not open to criticism when understood as requiring that the
risk shall rest on that party . . . who . . . has . . . the substantial
rights....
Although he left somewhat unsettled his position on the plausibility of basing
risk on ownership, Williston left no doubt as to his view that risk issues should
be addressed through application of contract principles, and that those principles
should predominate.
He stated more strongly than before the idea that the Paine rule was
anachronistic because it had been formed before contract law had come into its
own.149 In particular, before Paine there had not been developed the doctrine of
mutual dependency, making the buyer's promise to pay and the seller's promise
to convey dependent on one another. Had that doctrine been developed earlier,
Williston speculated that the concept of equitable ownership relied on in Paine
might never have arisen. Once the dependency doctrine had come about, the
concept of equitable ownership used in Paine should have been discarded. He
observed that civil law countries had undertaken such a transformation, first using
a rule equivalent to Paine, then developing the doctrine of mutual dependency,
and finally rejecting the rule equivalent to Paine. Williston characterized the
continued reliance on Paine in Anglo-American law as "an illustration of an
unfortunate but common habit of the law to follow precedents when the reason
for them no longer exists."'-'' He concluded with the hope that "[t]he law of the
United States if not of England may yet, as the law of the continent of Europe
ultimately has done, discard a doctrine of risk fundamentally inconsistent with
that of the mutual dependency of bilateral promises.''
147. See, e.g., id. §§ 936,937,939.
148. Id. § 939.
149. See id. § 933.
150. Id.
151. i In 1895 Williston had argued, as had the Massachusetts court, that the dependency doctrine was
significant because it made the buyer's obligation to pay dependent on substantial performance of the seller's
obligation to convey and deliver the premises. In 1920 he added another reason for seeing the rise of the
dependency doctrine as significant to risk allocation. Before the doctrine arose, the seller's promise to convey,
being independent of the buyer's promise to pay, was effectively an unconditional obligation. In that light, as
of the moment the seller's promise was made it was virtually certain that the seller would indeed convey and
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Williston reiterated and expanded on the earlier argument based on the
doctrine of Taylor v. Caldwell (mutual excuse by impossibility, frustration of
purpose, failure of consideration).152 In conjunction with that analysis he enlarged
upon the earlier argument using the analogy of leaseholds. The effect being given
the Taylor doctrine in the trend of landlord-tenant cases, excusing the tenant upon
destruction of the leased premises, should be followed so as to lead away from
the Paine rule in land sales cases.
5 3
Finally, he reiterated that the ultimate objective of a rule of risk allocation
should be to carry out the intent of the parties on the question of risk, and the best
way to do that, lacking a specifically stated intent, was to use as a proxy the
parties' intent as to the point of transfer of substantial ownership. The best
evidence of intent as to the point of transfer of substantial ownership was the
actual transfer of possession." Using an equitable title rule to conclude that
ownership passed earlier than the parties intended, or a legal title rule to conclude
that ownership passed later than they intended, would not serve that objective.'55
In this second stage in his campaign, he stated it even more strongly than before,
as the core principle of contract law: "In the law of contracts unless the agreement
of the parties is in violation of public policy, it is the duty of the court to enforce
that agreement; not to substitute different rights and liabilities of its own
,,156creation.
As to the so-called practical considerations, Williston reiterated and more
fully elaborated the points made in 1895, that in addition to fulfilling the primary
concern of compliance with contract principles, his possession rule would serve
better than Paine to facilitate loss prevention, reduction of litigation, and coverage
by insurance.'57
The 1920 treatise was important, not only because it elaborated upon the
points made in the 1895 articles, but also because it came to be a far more
effective vehicle for carrying Williston's message. Over the years Williston's
make the buyer the owner at law. With that degree of certainty it was appropriate for equity to conceive of the
buyer as being certain to become the legal owner, and thus to treat the buyer as owner for various purposes,
and treat the seller as a mere trustee for the buyer's benefit. In Williston's view, that rationale for the equitable
ownership theory dropped away when contract law changed to treat the seller's obligation as dependent on the
buyer's promise to pay, as it became much less certain that the seller's obligation would come due. See id.
152. See id. §§ 943-946. For a full treatment of the Taylor doctrine in another chapter of the treatise,
separate from the chapter on land sales, see id. § 1946.
153. See id. §§ 944-946.
154. See id. §§ 939-940.
155. See id. §§ 939-944.
156. Id. § 939.
157. Id. § 942. Williston also noted that since his 1895 study, there had arisen what he saw as a
disturbing trend as to insurance. Courts had begun to manipulate long established insurance law principles in
order to work around the undesirable effects of the Paine rule. See id. at n.98. The trend Williston observed,
an interaction of insurance law and practices with risk of loss law, would be worthy of further study in its own
right.
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contracts treatise came to be widely cited, 158 regarded as Williston's most famous
work and was generally influential throughout the English-speaking world. 59 It
also helped earn Williston the reputation of the "foremost legal expert" on
contract law, which in turn led to his being selected to lead the drafting of the first
Restatement of Contracts, 160 a project which he began shortly after completing the




D. The Restatement (First) of Contracts: Williston and Corbin in the Third
Stage of the Campaign
From 1923 to 1932 Williston as Reporter and Arthur Corbin as Assistant
Reporter carried out the drafting 62 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts.
163
One can imagine the dilemma Williston was in when he began drafting the
portions of the Restatement addressing risk of loss issues. Advocating for radical
change of an established doctrine through law review articles and a treatise was
one thing; the Restatement was quite another. Unlike later Restatement projects,
the charge of the first Restatement drafters was to present, in clarified form, the
prevailing law, not to use the Restatements as vehicles for advocating on behalf
of minority or new rules.'6 To adhere strictly to that restriction would have led
to a Restatement capturing the established doctrine represented by Paine, with an
underlying theory basing risk allocation solely on property ownership, and a
158. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, MORE THAN 11,000 CASES CITING OR QUOTING WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS (1959).
159. See Austin W. Scott, [Tribute to] Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1330 (1963). The treatise
was quickly hailed as an essential reference work in contracts law generally. See, e.g. Arthur L. Corbin,
Williston's Law of Contracts, 29 YALELJ. 942,945 (1920) (book review) ("[N]o difficult question... should
be answered without first consulting Professor Williston's work."); Herbert W. Oliphant, Williston's Law of
Contracts, 19 MIcH. L. REv. 358 (1921) (book review) (accord). It was viewed as of equal importance in the
specialized field of sales of goods. See, e.g., Current Legislation: Proposed Warsaw Rules-1928 Relating to
Contracts CLF., Parts I & 11, 20 COLuM. L. REV. 652, 813 (1929). This 1929 examination of international law
on sales of goods frequently cites Williston's contracts treatise. The article's author is not identified, There are
strong substantive similarities to Llewellyn's later writings in the sales field, including his 1938 Through Title
article. See supra notes 23, and infra notes 235-64, and accompanying text. Such an important treatise could
not have escaped the attention of Llewellyn, who in the early 1920s was just beginning his career teaching
commercial law at Yale. See The Law School, 29 YALE L.J. 85, 86 (1919); The Law School, 30 YALE L.J, 56,
57 (1920). The treatise has continued in use to the present through a series of updating. Williston prepared a
second edition in 1936 which would certainly have come to the attention of Llewellyn and Corbin before and
during the drafting of the risk of loss provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code.
160. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) oF CoNTRACrs at ix (1932).
161. See Klau, supra note 122, at n.93.
162. See id. (providing descriptions of the drafting process); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr
(1974).
163. RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 160.
164. As Williston said of the Contracts Restatement, "the endeavor in this Restatement is to restate the
law as it is, not a new law... :'3 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 159 (1925).
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specific rule imposing risk on a buyer before the transfer of possession. Yet
Williston had already devoted much of his career to challenging that established
doctrine. He had found the Massachusetts doctrine preferable to Paine on several
points, and had forwarded his own proposal for a possession rule superior to both
the majority and minority rules.
On the question of stating a specific rule of risk allocation (equitable title,
legal title, or possession), Williston appears to have dealt with his dilemma by a
combination of compromise and deliberate vagueness. The Restatement did not
directly challenge the equitable title majority rule of Paine, neither did it
unquestioningly accept that rule. On the question of the underlying theory,
Williston moved far more boldly in the direction he had been advocating. He
restructured risk of loss issues almost entirely through the perspective of contract
doctrines, relegating the formerly dominant property thinking to a minor role, and
leaving the practical considerations to, at best, a minor role.
The Restatement's treatment of the specific rule pointing to buyer or seller
can best be understood after a study of the way in which the underlying theory
was addressed. Both inquiries proceed with some difficulty, as the first
Restatement was far from being a model of clarity.
A major shift in treatment of the underlying theory occurred between
Williston's earlier writings and the Restatement. In a sense, in the earlier writings
Williston had merely been talking about refocussing to emphasize contract over
property. In the Restatement he moved from mere talk to action. The Restatement
was drafted in such a way as to actually implement a contract-oriented approach.
The first clue to that shift comes from an examination of the terminology used.
Through all of the portions of the Restatement even remotely relevant to
treatment of risk of loss issues, there was only one instance in which the words
"ownership" or "title" or "property" were used.' 65 The terminology associated
with property thinking seems to have been deliberately avoided. Instead, the
provisions addressing risk issues used terminology associated with contract
thinking, words such as promise, duty, performance, condition, and discharge of
obligation.16 Even the words "risk of loss" were never used.' 67 That phrase had
long been associated with risk issues, and with the established property oriented
approach to those issues. Williston himself had used it extensively in his earlier
writings. Leaving it out of the Restatement could hardly have been an accident.
The most plausible reason for that choice is that the phrase was seen as too
closely associated with the property-oriented thinking from which it had sprung.
By leaving it out, along with all other words and concepts associated with
165. See RESTATEMENT (FRST), supra note 160, § 281 cmt. c (referring to "substantial incidents of
ownership").
166. See id. §§ 274, 281.
167. The phrase "risk of loss" did appear in the index. See id. at index. However, it was not used in the
table of contents, headings, or text of any portion of the Restatement.
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property thinking, the drafters reframed risk of loss issues into contract
terminology, and in a sense forced readers to think about risk issues from a
contract perspective.
The refraiming went beyond a change of terminology to a change in the way
risk issues would be approached. In property thinking, a court presented with a
risk issue began by asking two questions: Who bore the risk of loss, and who was
the owner at the time of the loss? The Restatement took a very different approach.
Upon the destruction of property being sold, the Restatement approach asked:
What effect did this destruction have on the rights and duties of the parties under
the contract for sale? That question was in turn answered through a set of distinct
but integrated provisions. The effect of the destruction on the seller's duty to
convey and deliver the land was answered through the doctrine of "Supervening
Impossibility" which typically would lead to the discharge of that duty, i.e.,
excuse of the seller. 6s That of course was the primary proposition of Taylor v.
Caldwell.
The effect on the buyer's duty to pay was answered through the doctrine
generally described as "Failure of [Seller's] Consideration as a Discharge of
[Buyer's] Duty."' 69 The gist of that doctrine, as applied in a contract for the sale
of land, was that the seller's failure to perform could discharge the buyer's duty
to pay. 170 Combining the two doctrine 71 led to this outcome: The destruction
would render the seller not liable for damages resulting from the failure to deliver
the property in its original form. 72 Whether it would free the buyer from the
obligation to pay depended on whether the seller had performed, at least
substantially, before the loss occurred. In other words, the question became: Had
the seller done what the seller promised to do in exchange for the buyer's promise
to pay? If so, the buyer's obligation to pay was not affected by the destruction.
If the seller had not performed, and could not perform because of the destruction,
the effect of the destruction was to discharge the buyer's duty to pay.
73
Williston had begun to urge such a contract-oriented, property-de-
emphasizing approach in his 1895 articles, and again more strongly in his 1920
treatise. Now with the Restatement he demonstrated the way risk issues would be
implemented in a contract-oriented regime of law. It could be viewed as an overly
bold step, in light of the established nature of the Paine and Bracton approach,
and the instructions to the Restatement drafters to clarify, not change, the law.
Perhaps Williston and the others involved rationalized their draft as being not so
bold, as viewed from the perspective that the old way of thinking about risk of
168. Id. §§ 457,460.
169. Id. § 274.
170. Id. § 281. Section 281 was a specific application of the general doctrine stated in section 274. Id.
171. See id. § 460 cmt. e (cross-referencing the two doctrines).
172. Id. §§ 457,460.
173. Id. § 281.
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loss had simply failed to reflect development of general contract doctrine that had
been underway for many years and was by then quite mature. 74
Perhaps because the drafters were so concerned with the relative roles of
contract thinking and property thinking, they included nothing in the Restatement
explicitly referring to the practical considerations Williston had earlier forwarded
as subsidiary factors for adopting a risk of loss rule.
With that background of the Restatement's theoretical approach to risk issues,
the specific rule pointing to buyer or seller can be considered. It is quite difficult
to get a clear picture as to whether the Restatement approach would lead to the
same result in a particular case as the Paine equitable title rule, the Massachusetts
legal title rule, or the Williston possession rule. The vagueness might be a result
of the perceived role of the Restatement to state only general principles of law,
not necessarily provide concrete rules for specific situations. However, it might
also be that Williston thought it better to be vague rather than further the existing
rules he thought to be bad law, or use his own rule, which as yet had no
significant support in case law. The result is a provision in the Restatement which
seems to be a compromise. It provides that after destruction, the buyer is
discharged from the obligation to pay if the seller has not previously rendered
"substantial performance."' 75 That provision, which seems to favor the Williston
rule, is balanced by another.
After a contract to sell land and a building, in some states under some
circumstances the buyer is held bound to pay the price in spite of the
destruction of the building. These are not exceptions to the rule.., since
the result is based on a premise that substantial incidents of ownership
had already passed to buyer before destruction. 76
Although it left unclear the outcome of the contest between the equitable title,
legal title, and possession rules, the Restatement of Contracts represented a major
174. The Restatement reflected another aspect of the maturation of contract doctrine. It concerned the
rationale underlying the doctrine by which the buyer's duty might be discharged as a result of the seller's
failure to perform. Previously, the Massachusetts cases and Williston had used the fiction of an implied
agreement of the parties, a rationale consistent with classical contract theory. Now the Restatement dropped
the fiction and admitted that the doctrine was based on the policy that "justice [so] requires." Id. § 274 cmt.
d. That may have been one of the modernizing moves Williston referred to when he wrote that although the
drafters were trying to restate the law as it existed, nevertheless "it has been thought vital to discard outworn
fictions:' 3 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 159 (1925).
175. REsTATEmENT(FRST), supra note 160, § 281.
[A] promisor is discharged from the duty of performing his promise if substantial performance of
the return promise is impossible because of the non-existence, destruction or impairment of the
requisite subject-matter... provided that the promisor has not himself wrongfully caused the
impossibility or has not assumed the duty the subject-matter or means of performance shall exist
unimpaired.
Id.
176. Id. § 281 cmt. c.
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step in the process of reorienting the theory of risk of loss law to give principles
of contract the dominant position. The Restatement was of course a far more
powerful vehicle for that process than Williston's prior writings, as it represented
the voice of the entire American Law Institute. It was a voice shared in by Corbin
as Assistant Reporter, and clearly heard by Llewellyn as an observer of the
project.17
7
The Institute presented another opportunity for Williston to address the issue
of risk of loss in sales of land. As the Contracts Restatement was in its last stages,
the Institute planned a Restatement of Sales of Land (Vendor and Purchaser), and
assigned Williston as the Reporter. 78 However, the project was shelved due to a
shortage of funds before Williston could present a draft of the risk of loss
provisions.1 79 One point of value can be taken from the reports of the drafting
work. The drafters reported having great difficulty coming up with workable
definitions of concepts of ownership used in the midst of a sale transaction,
particularly the concept of "title."'8
0
Williston converted his work on the Land Sales Restatement into the drafting
and proposing of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. t'a By the time the
Risk Act was completed, Williston's earlier efforts had begun to make some
headway, attracting the attention and sometimes the support of other scholars, and
of the judges.
177. Llewellyn was clearly attentive to the Restatement drafting from the very outset of the project in
1923. See Karl Llewellyn, Relation of Current Economic and Social Problems to the Restatement of the Law:
From the Point of View of the Economist and Business Man, 10 PRoc. ACAD. POL. Sci. 331, 338 (1924).
Llewellyn was a former student of Corbin, and an avid admirer of Corbin's work, having once described
Corbin as his "father in the law." GILMORE, supra note 162, at 60.
178. See 11 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 16 (1934); 12 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 150 (1935) (May 1935 Discussion of
Sales of Land, Tentative Draft No. 1).
179. See 13 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 11, 77 (1936).
180. 12 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 150-58 (1935) (May 1935 Discussion of Sales of Land, Tentative Draft No.
1); see id. at 154 ("I never knew what title meant and I am not sure I have yet found out. We have had an awful
time with it."). The difficulties of defining the concept of title were also reflected in the work of the drafters
of the Restatement (First) of Property. Although the Property Restatement included a definition of "title," the
drafters actually avoided using that concept in pronouncing the principles and rules of property law. See
RESTATBENT (FRST) OF PROPERTY, Ch. I (1936) (providing definitions). Corbin later made reference to the
difficulties the Property Restatement drafters had experienced with the concept of title. He used their
experience to support the reformulation of risk of loss rules in the Uniform Commercial Code. See Corbin,
supra note 25, at 825-27.
181. The Institute viewed Williston's work on the Act as an extension of his work on the Land Sales
Restatement. See 12 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 409,426 (1935) (May 1935 Report on the Future of the Institute).
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E. The Response of Courts and Scholars Through the Third Stage of the
Campaign
Many of the writers in this period were at least persuaded that the Paine
equitable title rule was bad law and should be replaced t82 A few specifically
supported Williston's possession rule as the best alternative.'83 Others favored the
general thrust of Williston's proposal to use possession as the test, but offered
rather vague and complex variations using factors other than possession alone.'14
With those variations forwarded, the writers observed that there were now at least
five distinguishable rules for land risk with either scholarly support or case law
support." 5
The majority of courts continued to follow the Paine rule, some even
explicitly considering and rejecting the use of possession as the test for transfer
of risk.8 6 However, support for Williston's rule began to build, particularly after
the 1920 publication of his Contracts treatise. It began with a strong dissentihg
182. See, e.g., Nelson R. Pimie, Note, Equity: Risk of Loss in Executory Contract for the Sale of Realty,
6 CORNELL L. Q. 111, 112 (1921) (criticizing Paine).
183. See Morris Karon, supra note 135; Comment, Vendor and Purchaser-Risk of Loss After Contract
to Convey But Before Actual Conveyance-Possession as Determining Factor, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 240-41
(1930). The supporters typically focussed on the possession rule as a superior means of implementing the
ownership principle, or as superior according to the practical considerations, but did not focus much on
Williston's effort to reorient the law toward contract thinking. See, e.g., Simpson, 1I, supra note 2, at 756-57,
759 (approving the point that the party in possession more nearly had substantial ownership, and finding
persuasive Williston's arguments about loss prevention and insurance).
184. See Harry L. Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate
and Transfer of Title, 8 MIN. L. REV. 127 (1924) (presenting one of the more solid analyses). Vanneman was
persuaded of the need to replace Paine, the appropriateness of shifting away from property concepts and toward
contract oriented treatment of risk of loss issues, and the merits of Williston's possession proposal. However,
Vanneman argued for a modification, by which possession would be only one of several circumstances to be
examined to determine whether the parties had intended to transfer substantial ownership, and thus risk. He
would also take into account evidence of agreements on such matters as a duty of one party to care for the land,
a duty to pay taxes, a duty to obtain insurance coverage, and the specific right to returns (rents and profits) from
use of the land during the executory period. See id. Vanneman's article and his proposed modification of
Williston's suggested rule were later widely cited in the treatises. See, e.g., MCCLINTOCK, supra note 21, §
113.
185. See R.T. Miller, Notes: Equitable Conversion by Contract, 26 KY. L.J. 56 (1937) (providing a
particularly thorough listing and comparison of the five rules); see also Simpson, 1I, supra note 2, at 755-57;
Everett J. Brown, Jr., Comment, Risk of Loss Occurring Between Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and
Transfer of Legal Title, 22 CAL. L. REv. 427 (1934); Pirnie, supra note 182.
In addition to the Paine equitable title rule, the Massachusetts legal title rule, Williston's possession rule,
and other scholars' variations on the possession rule, there was a proposal by Professor Langdell that risk
would pass at the time originally set for conveyance of legal title, regardless of whether the conveyance was
actually completed. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 11.30.
186. See, e.g., Reife v. Osmers, 169 N.E. 399 (N.Y. 1929); Brownell v. Board of Educ., 146 N.E. 630
(N.Y. 1925) (rejecting use of possession as crucial factor, imposing loss on buyer despite seller being in
possession); see generally Robert Diller, Legislation and Risk of Loss Cases, 5 U. CHi. L. REv. 260 (1938)
(surveying cases).
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opinion in a 1921 Nebraska opinion which drew significant attention. 87 Then in
a 1930 Wisconsin case, a court for the first time explicitly adopted Williston's
proposed rule, and that case also drew extensive attention. 88
Two additional supporting decisions came after the Contracts Restatement
was completed in 1932. A 1933 California decision adopted the possession rule,
and adopted extensive portions of Williston's arguments to support the rule. 89 A
1935 Connecticut decision cited the Restatement in rejecting the Paine rule, and
drew much attention.1tg
The volume and intensity of the debate in this period prompted one
commentator to describe risk of loss in sales of land as "the most debated
question in the law of vendor and purchaser ..... ,, 91 It was also a question that
from the medieval era of Bracton until 1935 had been addressed "without
legislative aid or hindrance."' 92 Williston was about to change that.
187. McGinley v. Forrest, 186 N.W. 74 (Neb. 1921) (Dean, J., dissenting). Although the majority held
to the Paine rule imposing risk on the buyer, the dissent strongly argued for a possession-based rule by which
the risk would have fallen on the seller. The attention given the opinion boosted the attention given Williston's
campaign. The case was presented at 22 A.L.R. 567 and cited in several notes, articles, and eventually treatises,
See, e.g., Recent Cases, Vendor and Purchaser-Sale of Land-Destruction of Buildings by Fire, 70 U. PA.
L. REV. 248 (1922).
188. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 228 N.W. 505 (Wis. 1930). The court imposed the loss on the seller
who had retained possession. For examples of the attention drawn by the case, see Bernard Soref, Note, Vendor
and Vendee: Real Property: Risk of Loss: Insurance, 14 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (1930); Vernon Swanson, Note,
Insurance-Risk of Loss on Vendor When in Possession-Vendee Cannot Recover Insurance Money, 5 WIs.
L. REV. 503 (1930).
189. Kelly v. Smith, 218 Cal. 543, 24 P.2d 471 (Cal. 1933). The decision, along with other California
cases, was examined in Brown, supra note 185.
190. Anderson v. Yaworski, 181 A. 205 (Conn. 1935). Under the circumstances it was not necessary to
choose between the Massachusetts legal title rule and Williston's possession rule, and the court did not make
clear which it favored. The case was presented in 101 A.L.R. 1232 (1936). See also Recent Decision, Specific
Performance-Vendor and Purchaser Relation-Burden of Loss on Destruction of Premises by Fire, 13
N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 492 (1936); Recent Case, Vendor and Purchaser-Risk of Loss-Accidental Damage to
Property Between Contract and Conveyance, 49 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1936).
191. Simpson, 1I, supra note 2, at 754. For writings of this period in addition to those listed in the
preceding footnotes, see Albion M. Griffin, Note, Risk of Loss in Executory Land Contracts, 4 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 506 (1929) (questioning where the loss should fall for destruction prior to conveyance in an executory
contract for land); W.H., Note, Contracts-Risk of Loss Between Vendor and Purchaser in Land Contract, 24
MICH. L. REv. 838 (1926) (surveying and analyzing thoroughly American cases and updating English law);
M.H.H., Note, Contracts-Risk of Loss Under Executory Land Contract-Disposition of the Insurance
Proceeds, 29 MicH. L. REv. 487 (1931) (analyzing cases); Note, The Vendor's Liability for Permissive Waste,
48 HARV. L. REV. 821 (1935) (examining in detail the imposing of loss on seller at fault in causing loss); see
alsdohn L. Davis, The Origin of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion by Contract, 25 KY. L. REV. 58 (1936)
(disputing usual assertions about the historical roots of the equitable ownership doctrine on which the Paine
rule was based).
192. Simpson, 11, supra note 2, at 769.
1996/A Missing Chapter in the History of the U.C.C.
F. The Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act: Williston and Llewellyn
in the Fourth Stage of the Campaign
In 1934 Williston went to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws with a proposal for a uniform statute to govern risk of loss
in sales of land.193 In 1935 the Commissioners approved the statute and
recommended it to the states as the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act.
194
Llewellyn was to play a very active role in the Commissioners' handling of
Williston's proposal. The proposal, and the draft statute Williston included with
the proposal, were assigned initially to be considered by the Conference's
Commercial Law Committee, including Commissioner and Committee member
Karl Llewellyn.195
The promulgation of the Risk Act was clearly a victory in Williston's
campaign to replace the specific Paine equitable title rule with a possession
rule.'9 The Act provides that risk of loss remains with the seller until transfer of
possession, or completion of the conveyance by transfer of legal title.97
193. See id.
194. See UNiP. VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACr, 14 U.L.A. 471 (1935) (Mastered. 1990) [hereinafter
RISK Acr] (providing in principal part:
§ 1 Risk of Loss.
Any contract hereafter made in this State for the purchase and sale of realty shall be interpreted as
including an agreement that the parties shall have the following rights and duties, unless the
contract expressly provides otherwise:
(a) If, when neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject matter of the contract has
been transferred, all or a material part thereof is destroyed without fault of the purchaser or is taken
by eminent domain, the vendor cannot enforce the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover
any portion of the price that he has paid;
(b) If, when either the legal title or the possession of the subject matter of the contract has
been transferred, all or any part thereof is destroyed without fault of the vendor or is taken by
eminent domain, the purchaser is not thereby relieved from a duty to pay the price, nor is he entitled
to recover any portion thereof that he has paid).
195. See id. at 144 (Supp. 1995); Simpson, 1I, supra note 2, at 773. Llewellyn served in several capacities
in the Conference, including chair of the Committee on Amendments to Uniform Commercial Acts, and chair
of the Section on Uniform Commercial Acts. See McCurdy, supra note 61, at 582; John D. Wladis,
Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the
Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503, 530-32 (1988).
Williston too was a long time participant in the Conference, serving as Commissioner from Massachusetts
from 1910 to 1929 as well as drafting several uniform laws beginning with the Sales Act in 1902 and ending
with the Risk Act in 1935. See WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 219-27.
196. The Act resulted "in the most general and thoroughgoing single change in the law of equitable
conversion by contract which has yet been made by legislative action." Simpson, II, supra note 2, at 773.
197. The Act provides that risk of loss remains on the seller "when neither the legal title nor the
possession of the subject matter of the contract has been transferred" and passes to the buyer "when either the
legal title or the possession of the subject matter of the contract has been transferred... RisK ACT, supra note
194, § l(a), (b). Clearly the Act is contrary to the Paine rule, which would have risk pass immediately upon
formation of the contract, without awaiting transfer of possession. The Act also differs from the Massachusetts
legal title rule, which would have risk remain on the seller until legal title had been transferred, even if the
buyer previously took possession. The Act has been widely recognized as a codification of "the Williston
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The Act also represents the culmination of Williston's forty year journey
from property thinking to contract thinking. First, it accommodates the core
classical contract notion that an express agreement of the parties on the precise
question of risk allocation should be enforced.'"8
Second, and more importantly, in the absence of express agreement, the Act
decidedly places principles of contract law over all others. Like the Contracts
Restatement, the shift from property to contract thinking is reflected in the
terminology of the Act, and in the approach used to address risk issues. Words
such as "ownership" associated with property thinking are not used in the Act.'99
The Act does not use the phrase "risk of loss" that had come to be associated with
property-based thinking.2  Most significantly, the opening line of the Act is
stated in contract terminology: "Any contract.., for the purchase and sale of
realty shall be interpreted as including an agreement that the parties shall have the
following rights and duties .... ,20'
The Act, like the Restatement, approaches risk issues not by asking, Who
bears the burden of risk and who is the owner? Rather, it addresses the effect the
destruction of the property has on the rights and duties of the parties, including
the seller's right to enforce the contract, the buyer's duty to pay the price, and the
buyer's right to recover any portion of the price paid prior to the destruction.20 2
possession rule." Long v. Keller, 104 Cal. App. 3d 312,317, 163 Cal. Rptr. 532, 534 (1980). Accord Heerdt
v. Brand, 70 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1947) (citing a report of the New York Law Revision Commission).
In the drafting process, the Commissioners briefly considered a provision which would have taken into
account not only possession but also the additional factor of a specific agreement giving one party the right
to receive rents and profits. See Note, Legislation, Adoption of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
in New York, 6 BRoOK. L. REv. 372, 374-75 (1937) [hereinafter Adoption of the UVPRA]. The rejected
provision would have followed the model urged by Vanneman. See Vanneman, supra note 184.
198. The Act does not govern when "the contract expressly provides otherwise." RISK ACT, supra note
194, § 1. The Act does not explicitly indicate what result is to follow when the parties had made an express
agreement as to allocation of risk. The implication is that loss allocation in such circumstances is to be
governed by state law outside the Act. Presumably, that would lead to enforcing the specific agreement and
imposing the loss on the party who had agreed to accept the risk, in accord with the accepted doctrine that
preceded the Act. There was minor debate about the wording of that part of the Act, but not about the basic
notion of respecting an express agreement. See Simpson, I!, supra note 2, at 771 n.273.
199. The only such word used is the term "legal title" and it is used more in the way of describing the
occurrence of a key event, like transfer of possession, than to refer to an abstract ownership concept. See RISK
ACT, supra note 194, § l(a), (b).
200. Even the word "risk" appears only once-in the title, "The Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk
Act." Williston apparently wished to avoid even that use of the term. He submitted the draft under the name
"Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Act" and the word "Risk" was added to the title by the Conference
Committee. See Simpson, II, supra note 2, at 769 n.268.
201. RIsKAc, supra note 194, § 1.
202. Id. § l(a), (b). The Act does not directly address the question of whether the seller is to be excused
under the doctrine of impossibility or held liable for breach should the destruction occur prior to the transfer
of possession or legal title (i.e., while risk is still on the seller). Presumably, that and various other questions
about the rights and duties of the parties were to be left to general contract law outside the Act. Williston and
the Commissioners must have viewed that general contract law as being best represented in the Contracts
Restatement.
200
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Reports of the drafting discussions among the Commissioners clearly show
that the final form of the Act was meant to emphasize principles of contract over
those of property, and that this emphasis was carefully considered and understood
to be a dramatic break from longstanding precedent. The reports also make it
clear that Karl Llewellyn not only observed the discussions, but was deeply
involved in them, and in the early discussions actually argued for retaining a
property-based approach. The reports come both through unpublished transcripts
of two meetings of the Commissioners in 1934 and 1935,03 and a published
commentary from observer Sidney Simpson.
The final decision to frame the risk allocation rule of the Act in terms of
contract rather than property came in the context of determining the jurisdictional
reach of the Act in cases connected to more than one state. Some background in
theories of jurisdiction, as represented in the field of conflicts of law, will make
the context more easily understood. The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
was drafted in roughly the same period of time as the Risk Act, and so reflects the
then current thinking on those jurisdictional theories 0s In the thinking of the
time, the two important jurisdictional facts in a land sale transaction were the
place at which the contract was formed and the situs of the land. The Conflicts
Restatement incorporated a set of rules that basically divided land sale trans-
actions into aspects of contract law and aspects of property law. It provided that
any questions regarding the contract side of a transaction, such as the validity of
the contract, were to be decided according to the law of the place at which the
contract was formed.2°  Questions regarding the effect a valid contract might have
on ownership of the land were to be decided according to the law of the place in
which the land was located." 7 In particular, the question of whether the formation
of the contract caused a transfer of ownership to the buyer through the doctrine
of equitable conversion was to be decided by the law of the situs of the land.208
203. The transcripts are of proceedings of the Commissioners in 1934 and 1935. They are available on
microfiche, and are on file with the author. See Consideration of the First Tentative Draft of a Uniform Vendor
and Purchaser Risk Act, Committee of the Whole, Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Aug. 1934) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journat) [hereinafter
1934 Proceedings]; Consideration of the Second Tentative Draft of a Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act,
Committee of the Whole, Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (July 1935) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter 1935 Proceedings].
204. Professor Simpson's reporting and commentary on the drafting of the Act appeared in his extensive
article on equitable conversion. See Simpson, 1!, supra note 2. at 769-73. Simpson also served as Assistant
Reporter while Williston served as Reporter for the never-completed Restatement of Sales of Land (Vendor
and Purchaser). See 11 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 16 (1934); 12 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 8, 150 (1935) (May 1935
Discussion of Sales of Land, Tentative Draft No. 1).
205. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
206. Id. § 340.
207. Id. §§ 209,239.
208. Ia4 The Restatement featured an illustration showing that if the contract was formed in ajurisdiction
which recognized conversion, but the land was in a jurisdiction which did not, then the buyer would not have
gained an equitable property interest in the land. Id. § 209, illus. 2. This principle was further clarified in
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Presumably Williston and the Commissioners had that regime in mind when
they considered the jurisdictional scope to give the Risk Act in cases involving
contacts with more than one state. After Williston presented his proposed Act,
Llewellyn proposed an amendment to the Act's jurisdictional clause that would
have made the Act applicable to all trahsactions affecting land inside the adopting
state, including transactions conducted through contracts made outside the state
for the sale of land located in the state. In the context of the conflict of laws rules,
Simpson explained that adopting the Llewellyn proposal would necessarily put
the Act in the form of a "rule of property." 2The other alternative considered was
to make the Act applicable to all contracts formed in the adopting state, affecting
land situated in or out of the state. As Simpson wrote, that was viewed as a "rule
of interpretation [of] contracts."2'0
It would be "highly anomalous" to draft the Act to incorporate both
"divergent theories" and so the relative merits of each were considered and one
was selected.21' Simpson observed that the chief merit of Llewellyn's property-
oriented proposal was that the ownership principle was the theory of risk
allocation accepted by the courts in most jurisdictions and by most lawyers of the
time.21 2 Simpson advised that, if the Conference wished to follow the long
accepted theory, it should adopt Llewellyn's proposal and frame the Act as
changing the rule of property by using a new definition of ownership (substituting
possession for the Paine rule), rather than adopting a rule of contract? 3
In the end the Commissioners rejected Llewellyn's proposal and stayed with
the original language with the result that, as Simpson observed, the Act "proceeds
on the theory that the allocation of the burden of loss.., is a matter of contract
between the parties.... ,,214
Any contract hereafter made in this State for the purchase and sale of
realty shall be interpreted as including an agreement that the parties shall
have the following rights and duties, unless the contract expressly
provides otherwise: ....25
another section stating that a court of one jurisdiction could not by equitable decree create an equitable interest
in land in another jurisdiction. Id. § 240.
209. Simpson, 11, supra note 2, at 770.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id ("[Risk of loss law generally is thought of as] a rule of property law which may be abrogated
by express contract, rather than as a rule as to the interpretation of land contracts").
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also 1934 Proceedings, supra note 203, at 12 (providing Williston's statement).
215. RISK Acr, supra note 194, § 1. One reason for the rejection of Llewellyn's proposal was that it was
thought likely to create significant conflict of laws problems. Simpson, 11, supra note 2, at 770. A few years
later students at Llewellyn's school (Columbia) prepared a Note examining the conflicts problems, probably
following an interest triggered by Llewellyn's experience with the Risk Act, although the Note made no
reference to the Risk Act. See Note, Choice of Law for Land Transactions, 38 COLtUM. L. REV. 1049 (1938).
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In addition to choosing to base the new Act on contract rather than property
theory, the Commissioners also gave some consideration to one of the practical
considerations Williston had introduced with his 1895 articles, the matter of
insurance. In fact, the initial proposed draft included language dealing with
insurance, 16 and Llewellyn then proposed an amendment dealing even more
expansively with insurance.17 The Commissioners rejected those provisions,
leaving the final version of the Act silent as to matters of insurance."' It does not
appear that other practical considerations, in particular, incentives for loss pre-
vention, were given much attention within the Conference.2 9 It seems that the
Commissioners devoted their attention to the more momentous matter of
dethroning property thinking and elevating contract thinking to the dominant
position.
The final version of the Risk Act, like other early Uniform Laws and unlike
later Uniform Laws, has no explanatory comments or illustrations. Given
Williston's extensive role in campaigning for the reforms that the Act represents
and his role in drafting and lobbying for acceptance of the Act by the
Commissioners, it can be said that his earlier writings are the best sources for
understanding the full implications of the Act. In a sense they are substitutes for
the official commentary. It is also a virtual certainty that those writings played
prominently in the deliberations of the Commissioners, especially in light of the
great stature that Williston's Contracts treatise had attained. It seems highly
probable then that Commissioner Llewellyn, in addition to being exposed to
Williston's thinking in the debating of the Act, both at the Committee level and
before the Conference as a whole, must have carefully studied Williston's
writings on the topic of risk of loss in sales of land.
As a Commissioner, and one closely involved in the promulgation of the Risk
Act, Llewellyn must also have followed the reception given the Act by scholars
and lawmakers in the years between its promulgation in 1935 and Llewellyn's
work on the Uniform Commercial Code. New York adopted the Risk Act
The Note was published in 1938, the same year as Llewellyn began his campaign for reform in sales of goods.
See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
216. See Simpson, II, supra note 2, at 769-70. Compare the draft there described by Simpson to the final
version of the Act. See also 1934 Proceedings, supra note 203, at 9.
217. See Simpson, II, supra note 2, at 772-73; see also 1934 Proceedings, supra note 203, at 27-28.
218. See the substantive provisions of the Act, supra note 194. Simpson offered several insights as to
the reasons for excluding matters of insurance from the Act. There was some concern that the proposed
insurance provisions would create conflict of laws problems, that political opposition from the insurance
community would doom the Act, and that since the issues were primarily matters of insurance law, they should
be dealt with through a vehicle other than the Risk Act. See Simpson, 11, supra note 2, at 772-73; see also 1934
Proceedings, supra note 203, at 28-29; 1935 Proceedings, supra note 203, at 4.
219. See Simpson, II, supra note 2, at 771 (observing that there was actually very little discussion of the
substantive provisions of the Act).
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immediately after its approval by the Conference22 and, by the time Llewellyn
was involved in drafting the Code, seven jurisdictions had adopted the Act. t
There was a great deal of writing on the topic of risk of loss in land sales in those
years as well,m2 with many of the publications lauding the Risk Act.2U A few of
those scholars alluded to and some strongly urged greater attention to the parallels
of risk of loss law in land sales and goods sales.224
Beginning soon after promulgation of the Act, Williston issued a second
edition of his landmark contracts treatise, with its extensive treatment of risk of
loss, publishing the final volume in 1938.2 Williston also retired in 193 8,m and
in his autobiography he wrote of his campaign to reform the law of risk of loss
in sales of land. The Risk Act "has not yet been widely adopted, but I hope that
it may have success in the future." 227
Most American courts are still opposed to me; it is hard to get a court
that has once taken a position to reverse its opinion. Precedents are not
lightly overruled, but in a few instances such a change has come about
*.. and in states where it had not been decided before I wrote, the trend
of decisions supports my contention. I do not regard my battle as lostY
8
In the battle to replace the Paine rule with his possession rule, Williston had
won the support not only of a few courts, but of the Conference and several state
legislatures. In his long journey of rethinking risk of loss law away from property
220. The New York version was modified in minor ways. See Adoption of the UVPRA, supra note 197,
at 376-77 (describing the modification and prior case law); see also Note, Legislation-Vendor and Purchaser.
Uniform Risk of Loss Act, 14 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (1937). Llewellyn would likely have been especially
interested in New York's adoption of the Act, given that he was at the time on the faculty at Columbia. See 34
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 40 (1934); 37 COLum. L. REv. 429 (1937) (listing Llewellyn's faculty position).
221. By 1944, in addition to New York the Act was adopted in California, Louisiana, Michigan, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, and the Territory of Hawaii. See 14 U.L.A. (Supp. 1995).
222. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 185; Adoption of the UVPRA, supra note 197; Note, Legislation, The
Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1938) (providing a thorough analysis of the
Act).
223. See, e.g., Recent Case, Vendor and Purchaser-Risk of Loss-Accidental Damage to Property
Between Contract and Conveyance, 49 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1936); Legislation-Vendor and Purchaser.
Uniform Risk of Loss Act, supra note 221. But see Diller, supra note 186 (opposing the Act, urging that risk
of loss law be left to the courts to develop).
224. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 186 (arguing that goods law and land law should have essentially the
same approach to allocation of risk of loss); Simpson, I1, supra note 2, at 770 n.271 (comparing the Risk Act
and the Uniform Sales Act).
225. See SAMUEL WILLISTON (WITH GEORGE J. THOMPSON), ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(rev. ed. 1936-38). In accord with the wishes of the ALI, Williston structured the treatise to serve as a semi-
official accompaniment to the Contracts Restatement. See 3 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 405-10 (1925) (Report on
Treatise Accompanying the Restatement).
226. See WILLISTON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 64, at 333.
227. Id. at 228.
228. Id. at 260.
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thinking and toward a regime placing principles of contract above all else, he had
been joined by a few courts, the ALI (including Corbin), the Conference
(including Llewellyn), and several legislatures.
IV. LLEWELLYN'S CAMPAIGN FOR REVOLUTION IN SALES OF GOODS: FROM
LAND TO GOODS AND A Brr LEFr UNTOLD
In 1938, the year Williston concluded his campaign with a second edition of
his treatise and retired, Llewellyn wrote the article that came to symbolize
Llewellyn's campaign to reform the law of risk of loss in sales of goods.
The law as to goods had been frozen in place since the turn of the century,
and would remain so until Llewellyn's campaign began to find legislative success
in the 1950s. As captured in the Uniform Sales Act, the law held over since the
19th century was based on the ancient principle of res perit domino. The way to
allocate a loss as between the seller and buyer was to determine which was owner
of the goods at the time of loss-the same in 1938 as it had been in the middle
ages. As applied through the rule derived from Tarling v. Baxter,229 the law
provided that upon formation of a contract for sale, without awaiting transfer of
possession, the buyer of goods became the owner and therefore the risk bearer.
In broad theory and specific application, the law as to goods paralleled the law as
to land reflected in Paine v. Meller.230
The promulgation and wide adoption of the Sales Act beginning at the turn
of the century signalled uniform nationwide approval of its risk of loss
provisions. That approval continued to be shown through additional adoptions of
the Act up through 1941,"I and through efforts from 1917 to 1940 to enact a
federal version of the Sales Act, employing the same risk of loss doctrine to
govern interstate and international trade2
When Llewellyn initiated his campaign to change goods law in 1938, he
faced a challenge much like that Williston had faced in 1895 in beginning the
campaign to reform land law. However, Llewellyn had the benefit of Williston's
ground breaking. In particular, he had the Restatement of Contracts. 233In the 1932
229. 6 C & B 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827).
230. 6 Ves. Jun. 350, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801); see supra notes 44-48, 55-60, and accompanying
text.
231. See UNiF. SALES AcT, I U.L.A. at xv (1950) (providing a table of jurisdictions wherein the Act was
adopted). Also, important jurisdictions such as New York, which had adopted the Sales Act soon after its
promulgation, repeatedly reiterated their approval of the risk of loss provisions by leaving those provisions
intact despite amending other provisions of their versions of the Act on several occasions. See Study of the
Uniform Commercial Code, I N.Y. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 347 (1955) (describing various amendments
made to New York's version of the Sales Act).
232. See McCurdy, supra note 61, at 586.
233. Had the ALI had additional resources, Llewellyn might also have had the benefit of a restatement
of sales of goods. The ALI at one time contemplated such a restatement topic, but concluded that the resources
should be directed to areas more greatly in need of attention. See 4 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 103-04, 218-22 (1926)
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Restatement, Williston and Corbin had dealt with risk of loss in sales of goods in
essentially the same manner they used for sales of land, demonstrating a
contractual approach and de-emphasizing the property-oriented approach. As with
land sales, the Restatement approached risk issues for goods not so much by
asking, "Who was the owner?" Rather, it asked "What effect did the destruction
have on the rights and duties of the parties?"'2"
A. Llewellyn's 1938 Article: From Property to Contract and a Bit Beyond
in the First Stage
With the example of the Restatement at hand, and with all'that he had been
exposed to in the Conference's handling of Williston's Risk Act for land sales,
Llewellyn opened his campaign as to risk of loss in sales of goods with his 1938
article, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond. 5
Williston's initial motivation for his campaign as to land sales had been his
sense that the results dictated by the Paine rule were unjust. At the outset, the
underlying theories of property and contract were not his primary concern, and
his concern with the theories grew over the years. In contrast, for sales of goods
Llewellyn focussed on the underlying theories immediately, and actually paid
almost no heed at first to the specific rule of Tarling.
1. From property
Recognizing that goods sales law in general was "in one phase part of the law
of contract, in another phase part of the law of property,' ' 6 Llewellyn first turned
to examining the role of property law, which for risk of loss and other issues
appeared mainly in the form of the concept of "title" (the term Llewellyn used to
refer to ownership). He observed three failings in the use of the title concept in
sales law. Goods sales law (i) treated title to goods as if it were concrete and
objectively identifiable when it was not, (ii) proceeded as if title were singular
and located in one party when the incidents of ownership were actually split and
in transition during a sale, and (iii) used the single concept of title to govern not
only risk of loss but also a diverse multitude of other issues, each of which ought
to be governed by different policy concerns.2
37
(Report of Bigelow).
234. See REsTATEMENT(FI ), supra note 160, §§ 277,281,301,457,460,468.
235. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23. The 1938 article was one of a series in which Llewellyn
broadly examined the history of the general law of sales of goods and certain major reform trends in that
general law. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936);
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 11, 37 CoLUm. L. REv. 341 (1937); Llewellyn, Across Sales
on Horseback, supra note 23; Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, supra note 8.
236. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 159.
237. Id. at 165-66.
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The 19th century law captured in the Sales Act was besed on an assumption
that the location of title to goods being sold could be determined objectively and
with certainty. That premise had been valid when transactions were simple and
delivery of possession was required to transfer ownership. With modem complex
sale transactions, Llewellyn wrote that title to chattels had become a "mythical"
or "mystical" abstraction that the parties could not see or otherwise "objectively
and definitely" locate 8
In the law of property the concept of title had developed as a static and
indivisible concept. Title was expected to remain steadily in one person, and
when it did move, to move as a whole. This concept worked satisfactorily in early
sales law where transactions were made in "one stroke, shifting possession along
with title, no strings being left behind." 9 In contrast, modem commercial sales
were carried out through a "complicated series of actions" with matters in
"temporary suspension" or "active flux between the parties," and "no such Title
in either party." 240 Llewellyn wrote that except in such increasingly rare "single-
stroke" transactions, the relationship of seller and buyer had become one of
"dynamic movement to which the Whole-Title concept applies on neither side."24'
He held that in a body of law concerned with modem dynamic transactions the
old concept had became an "alien lump.'242
Llewellyn argued that sales law relied on title for too many issues, using it to
govern not only risk of loss but "every point which it can be made to govern"
both "between the parties" and "against outsiders. 243 In consequence, he wrote,
"the Title-concept lumps so many policy decisions together that the same decision
about Title, in two cases having similar facts, would repeatedly lead to
unfortunate results in one or the other...."244 That lumping together of diverse
issues under the single concept of title made it necessary for a judge to either
accept a "regrettable consequence" or use sleight-of-hand to manipulate the
location of title, which would eventually lead to uncertainty for the parties?45
238. Id. at 165.
239. Id. at 167.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 168.
242. Id. at 169. Llewellyn observed that the lump title concept had been clung to in the law of sales of
goods even though there were at hand models within the law of real property, demonstrating recognition of
ownership being divisible, and providing conceptual tools to describe such division. Those models and tools
included the splitting of legal and equitable ownership, and mortgagee and mortgagor interests. Id. at 166 n.9.
243. Id. at 169. In prevailing sales doctrine "the location of Title will ... govern, between the parties,
risk, action for the price, the applicable law in an interstate transaction, the place and time for measuring
damages, the power to defeat the other party's interest, or to replevy, or to reject; it will govern, as against
outsiders, leviability, rights against tort-feasors, infraction of criminal statutes about sales, incidence of
taxation, and power to insure." Id.
244. Id. at 171.
245. Id. at 172.
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Llewellyn studied the possibilities of continuing to use title-based thinking
with substantial modifications to counter the failings of then current doctrine. He
observed that goods sales law had already made some adaptations to deal with the
reality of ownership being split and in transition during complex sales
transactions 2 6 He found those efforts were insufficient, and tended to leave
obscured the issues to which the title concept was being applied.
2 47
Llewellyn concluded that sales law could not be salvaged as long as the
concept of title remained in its central position. He did not argue for the complete
abandonment of title in resolving issues, but did argue that it be used only where
no other means could be found with better results for a particular issue.248
Years earlier Williston, after studying the failings of the equitable ownership
concept in the doctrine of risk of loss in sales of land, had commented on the
law's unfortunate habit of clinging to such an outmoded concept. "Only the hoary
age and frequent repetition of the maxim prevents a general recognition of its
absurdity."249 Llewellyn concluded his study of the role of title in goods sales
with a similar sentiment, writing that it was "disgusting" that the lump title
concept had been allowed to continue to govern risk of loss and other issues
simply because "it was so laid down in the time of... the third George. ' ' 50
Although Williston in his early writings did not conclude that the principle
of ownership was utterly inappropriate for risk of loss law in sales of land, he did
make clear from the beginning that a far better approach was through principles
of contract law. By the end of his campaign, he implemented that assessment by
reformulating land sales law with contract principles given the primary role in
risk of loss. Llewellyn, for risk of loss in sales of goods, was quicker to conclude
that the ownership principle was unworkable, and equally quick to conclude that
risk of loss should be primarily determined through principles of contract.5
246. For example, there had been efforts to recognize differences between true title and title held merely
for purposes of security. Id. at 168-69, 195 n.69.
247. Id. at 169.
248. "I do not suggest the elimination of the Title-concept. It has its uses. But it should be made to serve
merely as the general residuary clause... as a better-than-nothing, when inquiry has failed to reveal any other
line of solution adapted to the problem in hand." Id. at 170.
249. WILISTON, CoNTRACTS TREATisE, supra note 39, § 929.
250. Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 175.
251. Llewellyn also concluded that principles of contract should be used to govern other issues, aside
from risk of loss, which in then current law had been governed by the title concept. For example, the lump title
concept had been used to determine whether or not a party could get remedies in the nature of specific
performance. Llewellyn argued that, rather than using the title concept, the better approach would be to make
that determination by applying the contract doctrine of benefit of the bargain. Id. at 175-77.
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2. To contract
When goods being sold are destroyed, Llewellyn wrote, the real question is,
"Must the buyer pay [the price]; or if it has been paid, can he get it back?"252 The
first step in answering that question would be to ask if there had been an express
agreement on the specific issue of risk of loss.253 If not, the second step would be
to ask "whether or not the active party [ordinarily the seller] had done enough of
what he agreed to do to earn his agreed award. '24 Llewellyn also explained that
dropping the focus on title, and moving to a focus on whether the seller had
sufficiently performed, would place risk of loss problems in their proper place in
an overall context of contract issues raised by the destruction of the goods being
sold. Using contract principles to determine the consequences of destruction of
goods would appropriately resolve not only the allocation of risk of loss, but also
the question of whether to excuse the seller from liability for damages for failing
to perform. 25
Llewellyn demonstrated the contractual approach to risk allocation by
reference to the duties taken on by a seller in a variety of typical transactions,
asking in each case whether the seller had earned the price by carrying out the
agreed upon obligation prior to the occurrence of the destruction:
(i) "He agreed to ship goods of a certain description. Well, has he
shipped? Or has anything supervened which makes it fair to
throw risk on the buyer without the shipment? ',256
(ii) "He agreed to hold specified goods until call. Well did he?' '2 7
(iii) "He was under duty to let the buyer inspect on demand. Is it
reasonable to disregard that duty, in view of the supervening
destruction?" '
(iv) "If he agreed to deliver at destination, and has not delivered,
how has he earned his price?"' 59
Llewellyn thus proposed an approach for goods sales that was strikingly
similar to the approach Williston had come to in sales of land?6 It eschewed
252. Id. at 182.
253. Id at 184. The risk allocation analysis would, of course, be undertaken only if the goods destroyed
had previously been specified as connected with the sale contract. Id. at 183-84.
254. Id. at 184.
255. Id. at 185 n.45.
256. Id. at 184.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 184-85.
260. See the treatment of Williston's approach in his 1895 articles, his 1920 Contracts treatise, the first
Restatement of Contracts, and the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. Williston, Civil Law, supra note
6; Williston, Common Law, supra note 6; Wiis"N, CONTRACTS TREATISE, supra note 39; RISK ACT, supra
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property thinking in favor of contract thinking. It framed risk issues as part of a
set of questions about the effect the destruction would have on the rights and
duties of the parties. Those questions were whether the buyer was obligated to
pay (or able to get back what was already paid), and whether the seller was liable
for failure to perform or was excused. The buyer's obligation to pay was
primarily dependent on whether the seller had performed as obligated at the time
of the destruction.
3. And a bit beyond
In the early stages of his campaign in land sales law Williston had urged
attention to certain practical considerations as additional factors supporting a risk
of loss rule already meeting the primary test of compliance with principles of
contract. Those practical considerations included facilitating loss prevention,
minimizing the likelihood of litigation, and maximizing the likelihood of
insurance coverage.
In Llewellyn's first stage, he began to take one of those practical con-
siderations into account, the matter of insurance. After identifying contract
thinking as superior to property thinking for risk allocation, he considered several
ways in which insurance might be taken into account. The thrust of his treatment
of insurance was essentially the same as Williston's; that sales law in general and
risk of loss doctrine in particular should not be formulated in such a way as to
make it difficult for the parties to insure and unlikely that there would be adequate
insurance coverage.26' Williston had argued that a risk allocation rule which
increased the ease and likelihood of having insurance coverage should be favored
over a rule which decreased the likelihood of coverage, assuming the favored rule
also met the prime test of carrying out general contract principles. Llewellyn took
a similar position. 62
note 194.
261. In insurance law, a person's ability to obtain insurance as to property loss depends on the
recognition of that person having an insurable interest in the property, with an insurable interest being
something in the nature ofa property interest. See ROBERTE. KEErON & ALAN 1. WIDISS. INSURANCE LAWV §§
3.2-3.4,4.3 (1988).
Under the then current law as to sales of goods, the power to insure had largely been limited by the
concept of lump title, such that only the so-called owner would be recognized as having an insurable interest.
See Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 169. Llewellyn argued that the insurable interest concept
should be given a broad interpretation, to make it easier for either party to obtain or maintain insurance
coverage during a sale transaction in which property interests were being split and shifted. Id. at 188-91; cf.
id. at 192 n.63 (arguing similarly for an expansive view of parties' rights to bring claims against a third party
at fault in causing a loss, such as a carrier).
262. Llewellyn made the point as to transactions in which the seller was to hold the goods temporarily
awaiting the buyer's call. Under the Tarling rule, the risk would be on the buyer, because the contract had been
formed. With the goods in the seller's possession, it would be unlikely for the buyer to have insurance.
Llewellyn observed that "[t]here would certainly be much to be said for a rule that, in mercantile cases, risk
should not pass... unless seller insured to cover buyer during any period in which, under the contract, seller
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At this stage in his campaign, Llewellyn included no significant treatment of
the other practical considerations Williston had proffered, prevention of loss and
avoidance of litigation. He also differed from Williston in that Williston had from
the outset sought to replace a specific rule pointing to one party as the risk bearer
(Paine, putting risk on the buyer). Llewellyn had not yet reached the point of
pronouncing the equivalent Tarling rule as bad law needing replacement.263
Aside from those differences, the themes Llewellyn laid out for his campaign
in goods law are remarkably similar to those Williston had announced and carried
through for land law. The ancient principle of ownership was failing in modem
complex transactions, particularly because possession and title had become
separated. With the development of contract law, the old property thinking should
be set aside and risk of loss in sales should be governed primarily by principles
of modem contract law. Practical considerations, including insurance coverage
should also be taken into account.
4. And a bit left untold
Llewellyn's 1938 article made no mention of the work that had already
occurred for reform of risk of loss law in the field of sales of land, including the
Risk Act in which Llewellyn had participated, the Contracts Restatement, or
Williston's contracts treatise or 1895 articles. In the opening footnote of the 1938
article, Llewellyn did include a statement that may shed some light on his
treatment of the relationship between his work and Williston's earlier work. The
works of others, he wrote, "are noted where I am conscious of the debt;
sometimes one absorbs, forgetting the source; and memory has a statute of
limitations of its own."264
Although Llewellyn's campaign would not be entirely successful until the
states began adopting the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1950s, the major
themes would all be solidly in place by 1944.
B. The Federal Sales Bill and the Uniforn Revised Sales Act: The Second
Stage
After Llewellyn's 1938 article, the next major developments came in the
context of efforts to enact a federal sales law. The efforts had begun in 1917, with
a plan to enact a federal version of the Uniform Sales Act, to govern interstate and
international trade. The initial efforts had been unsuccessful, and interest waned
retains control and holds at buyer's disposal" Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 184 n.44 (emphasis
in original).
263. Llewellyn actually did vaguely refer to the Tarling rule in the context of mentioning how insurance
might be taken into account in reformulating the risk of loss law. See id.
264. Id. at 159 n.*.
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during the 1920s and early 1930s as attention was being focussed on the
Restatements. Interest was revived in 1937, and in 1940 a Federal Sales Bill was
introduced in Congress. 26 In that period, there were no serious efforts underway
to revise the state law codified in the Uniform Sales Act, despite Llewellyn's
campaign. However, the introduction of the Federal Bill indirectly led to
reopening-of the Sales Act.
Enactment of federal law would have a major influence oh the near term
future of state sales law. From 1917 on, the plan had been to have the federal law
modelled after the Sales Act. In particular, this meant using the risk of loss
provisions of the Sales Act, which were based on ownership and codified the
Tarling rule to impose risk on the buyer without possession. If a federal version
replicating the provisions of the Sales Act were enacted, it would become
extremely difficult to uproot the Sales Act. States would be reluctant to change
their laws so as to create conflicts with federal law. On the other hand, if the
federal law enacted was more modem, incorporating the reforms Llewellyn was
advocating, then the states would feel pressure to replace more quickly the aging
Sales Act with modem state law modelled on the federal law, to maintain
uniformity. Supporters of Llewellyn's reform efforts came to see that the plan
to enact a federal law was of great importance because of its likely influence on
state law.6 7
The federal bill introduced in 19408 included risk of loss provisions
essentially identical to those of the Sales Act.269 Aware of the stakes, Llewellyn
and a collaborator, Nathan Isaacs,270 wrote articles opposing the bill's enactment.
Isaacs' article substantively attacked the old law of the Sales Act.27' In the
process, Isaacs added the element previously missing from Llewellyn's campaign,
a direct attack on the Tarling rule that had long been codified in the Sales Act and
was proposed for inclusion in federal law.
Isaacs viewed the Tarling rule for goods in much the same way Williston had
long viewed the Paine rule for land, with a sense of injustice. The rule was
"thoroughly logical" within the realm of property theory in which it had been
265. See generally McCurdy, supra note 61, at 585, 589 (describing the history).
266. See id. at 589-90; Thomas, supra note 22, at 557.
267. 'To extend the operation of the Uniform Sales Law to the federal sphere [would] give a new leaso
of life to the philosophy which it represents... Nathan Isaacs, The Sale in Legal Theory and in Practice, 26
VA. L. REV. 651,667 (1940). See also Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, supra note 23, at 561-62.
268. The Proposed Federal Sales Act, H.R. 8176, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). reprinted in 26 VA. L.
REV. 668-86 (1940).
269. See id. §§ 19, 20 (Rule 1). 23. For commentary, see Thomas, supra note 22, at 547-49; McCurdy
supra note 61, at 606-12.
270. Llewellyn and Isaaes shared views about the risk of loss provisions. Llewellyn's 1938 article cited
approvingly some of Isaacs' work. See Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 184 n.44.
271. See Isaacs, supra note 267.
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developed, but "nonsensical" as judged by modem business practices, and so did
not comport with expectations of the parties.
2 72
If I agree to sell you my old automobile for $300, to be delivered to you
and paid for on the first of next month, can you imagine your surprise if
I should then call you up before the end of this month and say: "I am
sorry, but your car has burned. Don't forget however, to have my check
ready on the first!" Yet that is precisely what is called for by the
nonsensical [Tarling] rule.... 273
Llewellyn's reaction to the federal proposal was more strategic. He took the
tack of urging Congress to avoid any action until the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws could first review the bill and give
Congress the benefit of the Conference's expertise in commercial law274
Although his request for a delay did not so indicate, Llewellyn had in effect asked
that the bill be turned over to his care. Llewellyn was by then already poised to
assume responsibility for the Conference's role in reviewing the federal bill2 75
Congress did not take action on the 1940 bill. In 1940 the Conference did take up
study of the federal bill, coupled that project with a plan to revise the Sales Act,
and appointed Llewellyn as chair of a special committee to take on the dual
task.276 The American Law Institute (ALI) then joined with the Conference in the
project, the two institutions jointly appointed Llewellyn as Reporter, and the ALI
appointed Arthur Corbin as its special advisor to participate with Llewellyn in the
drafting.277 Corbin took an "active and critical part" in the drafting thereafter.278
In 1944, Llewellyn, Corbin, and the others presented the first proposed draft
Revised Sales Act.279 The risk of loss provisions of the 1944 draft carried out the
theoretical reforms laid out in Llewellyn's 1938 article, as well as Isaacs' reform
272. Id. at 652.
273. Id.
274. Llewellyn, 77e Needed Federal Sales Act, supra note 23, at 562, 571.
275. Llewellyn had many years of involvement with the Conference. See 21 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 64-65
(1944) (Report on the Revised Sales Act). He had been a Commissioner since 1926, and had held such
influential positions as chair of the Committee on Amendments to Uniform Commercial Acts, and chair of the
Section on Uniform Commercial Acts. See id. at 263; McCurdy, supra note 61, at 582; Wladis, supra note 195,
at 530.
276. See N.C.C.U.S.L. Handbook 70 (1940); see also 21 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 63, 263 (1944) (Report on
the Revised Sales Act).
277. See 20 A.L.I. ANN. PROC. 38, 40-43 (1943) (Directors Report).
278. Corbin, supra note 25, at 821.
279. See The Uniform Revised Sales Act (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944), reprinted in I A.L.I. &
N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code: Drafts 505-06 (E. Kelly comp. 1984). The Conference and ALI had
directed Llewellyn's committee to proceed on the premise that the text they were drafting would be used either
as a federal law or a revised state law, or both, and as state law would be suitable for adoption either separately
as a Revised Sales Act, or as the sales division of a planned comprehensive commercial code. See 20 A.L.I.
ANN. PROC. 38,40 (1943).
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of the Tarling rule.280 Llewellyn articulated the reform themes in a discussion
accompanying the presentation of the draft to the ALI members.2s The report is
particularly useful because the draft did not yet include official commentary for
the risk of loss provisions.1
22
In accord with Llewellyn's 1938 article, the 1944 draft was based on the
understanding that the lump title concept failed to account for modem trans-
actions in which ownership interests were "divided... in the process of per-
formance of a contract."283 Consequently, the former central role of title was
eliminated, particularly for risk of loss.2 4
As Llewellyn had urged in 1938, the draft addressed risk of loss issues
through what Llewellyn described as a "contract-approach., 285 Risk of loss, and
other aspects of the "rights between buyer and seller" were addressed "primarily
in terms of the contract." Putting that theory of contract orientation into practice
resulted in allocating risk according to the "seller's successive stages of
performance,"' 2 7 so that the results could be stated "in terms of the particular
things that the seller has done."28
In the contract approach, the transfer of risk would depend not on the status
of title, but on whether or not "the seller is rightly performing his contract" or "is
in breach... ."289 Thus, risk would be allocated one way in a case "in which the
seller's action exactly conforms to what he is supposed to do, and therefore
amounts to performance... earning him rights" and allocated another way in a
case "in which what the seller has done is not what he is supposed to do under the
contract and is earning him liabilities for breach and is not earning him rights by
performance of conditions."290 For example, "in the normal order of events,"
transfer of risk of loss to the buyer would occur with a proper tender of delivery
by the seller, and would not occur if the seller had "not done what he was
supposed to do." 291
280. See Revised Sales Act, supra note 279, §§ 79, 80.
281. For a transcript of Llewellyn's presentation and discussion of the draft with the ALI members at
the 1944 Annual Meeting of the ALl, see 21 A.L.I. ANN. PRoc. 63-268 (1944) (Report on the Revised Sales
Act) [hereinafter 1944 Report].
282. See id. at 183-84.
283. Id. at 172.
284. See Revised Sales Act, supra note 279, §§ 79, 80; 1944 Report, supra note 281, at 74, 175-83.
285. See 1944 Report, supra note 281, at 74.
286. Id. at 170.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 74 ("if the seller is in breach, [risk] does not pass at all").
290. Id. at 170. The matter of the seller's liability for breach, in the sense of possibly being excused
under the doctrine of impossibility of performance, was addressed in Sections 86-89 of the Revised Act
("Events Interfering with Performance"). See id. at 188-90.
291. ld. at 171.
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The concern Llewellyn had shown for maximizing insurance coverage was
also implemented in the 1944 draft. In the 1938 article, Llewellyn had argued for
a broad interpretation of the insurance law concept of insurable interest, so as to
increase the ease and likelihood of at least one party obtaining or maintaining
insurance coverage in the midst of the sale. That objective was addressed in the
1944 draft by freeing the insurable interest concept from the limitations of the
concept of title and liberally allowing either party to insure during a sale?92
In addition to implementing the shift from property theory to contract theory,
the 1944 draft carried out Isaacs' objective of replacing the Tarling rule. Instead
of having risk pass as soon as the contract was formed, despite the seller's
retention of possession, the 1944 draft provided for risk to pass when possession
passed.293 This was perhaps the clearest instance of a change that would actually
lead to different results in risk allocation, rather than a change only in underlying
theory. The change was justified not only by Isaacs' earlier expressed sense that
Tarling did not comport with the usual expectations of the parties, but also
because the new possession rule was thought to better serve the practical
consideration of insurance.2'
The drafters had not yet formally articulated the practical considerations of
loss prevention and litigation avoidance as policies underlying the revised risk of
loss provisions. However, Llewellyn and Corbin had developed by 1944 a regime
of risk of loss in sales of goods that was in most other significant respects a close
match to the regime of risk of loss law Williston had shepherded into existence
for sales of land.
C. To the Current Version of the Code, and Williston's Strange Response:
The Third Stage
It would take until 1958 for Llewellyn and company to carry the draft
Revised Sales Act into the officially-accepted Sales Article of the Uniform
Commercial Code as we know it today.295 Along the way, they would draft the
official commentary explaining the underlying principles for the risk of loss
provisions, but in most important respects would leave those provisions
292. See id. at 172.
293. See id. at 180 (describing section 79 of the draft).
294. See id at 180-83; see also Llewellyn, Through Title, supra note 23, at 184 n.44 (describing Isaacs'
earlier, less sharpened thinking about the need for revision of the Tarling rule to better address the practical
consideration of insurance).
295. The long period was in large part a result of New York's less than enthusiastic reaction to the early
versions of the Code. New York carried out a massive study that led to significant changes in the Code. See
Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, I N.Y. LAw REvIsION COMM'N REP. (1955). The controversies that
caused the adoption of the Code to be delayed for so long mostly had to do with provisions other than risk of
loss. See Preliminary Report, supra note 4, at Introduction; Braucher. supra note 24, at 802-04. For a general
view of the process of creating the Code, see id.; William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 MiAMiL. REv. 1 (1967).
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essentially as drafted in 1944.29 Included among those provisions are the now-
controversial provisions of Section 2-5 10, targeted for elimination by critics and
the revising committee.
Also along the way to official acceptance of the Code, the drafters
encountered and succeeded despite the opposition of Williston. The Revised Sales
Act was put into the framework of a draft of the Code in 1949. Williston then
emerged from retirement to author his only detailed published treatment of the
revisions in a 1950 article: The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code.297 He criticized the Sales portion of the Code in general, and
had a few criticisms of the risk of loss provisions in particular.298
As to the Sales article in general, Williston's major criticism was that
promulgating the Code would destroy the interstate and international uniformity
it had taken so long to build up. As to uniformity between the states, experience
with other uniform laws showed that adoption of the new Code would be
accomplished slowly.299 In the meanwhile, there would be conflict between the
majority of states that continued to adhere to the old law represented in the Sales
Act and the minority of states adopting the new law of the Code. 300 He was
equally concerned about uniformity on an international level. A great strength of
the Sales Act was that it had been modelled after English law, and the English
law was widely followed throughout the common law world, including Canada,
and where not followed, was at least highly familiar.3°0 Adopting a radically
296. Section 2-101 sets out a general theme for the Sales Article of the Code:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract... and the various steps of its performance.
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract and action taken under it
without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed .... The purpose is to avoid making...
issues turn upon the location of an intangible ... abstraction ....
U.C.C. § 2-101, cmt. (1990).
For risk of loss, as for most issues, the Code implements the core principle of classical contract theory
by providing that an express agreement on the specific issue of risk of loss is to be enforced. See id. §§ 1-
102(3) Cmt. 3, 2-303, 2-509(4). In the absence of such a specific agreement, risk of loss is governed by sections
2-509 and 2-510 of the Code, the counterparts to sections 79 and 80 of the 1944 draft Revised Sales Act.
The official comments to those Code sections declare that the underlying principles are "the adoption of
the contractual approach rather than... 'property,"' and expectations about the parties' relative likelihood of
insuring the goods at any given point in time. See id. §§ 2-509 cmt., 2-5 10 cmt. Another established principle
is to impose risk on the party best able to guard against loss by taking care of the goods. See Jason's Foods,
Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1985).
297. Williston, The Proposed Code, supra note 54.
298. The article came to be known as Williston's "famous attack" on the Code. See Preliminary Report,
supra note 4, at 3 n.8. After Llewellyn's death, a typewritten copy of Williston's article was found in
Llewellyn's files. See Wladis, supra note 195, at 564 n.231.
The intensity of Williston's criticism coupled with his great stature in the legal community must have
presented a major threat to the drafters' hopes for acceptance of the draft Code. Corbin, as the other living
venerated statesman of contract law, and co-drafter of the Code, responded immediately with a published
defense of the Code. See Corbin, supra note 25; Preliminary Report, supra note 4, at 3 n.8.
299. Williston, The Proposed Code, supra note 54, at 562-63.
300. Id. at 562, 565. Williston wrote that 37 of 53 jurisdictions had adopted the Sales Act. Id.
301. Id. at 563-64.
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different domestic law would wipe out the existing international uniformity and
thus hamper America's role in the international trade burgeoning in the aftermath
of World War ]1.302
Williston's second general criticism related to another sort of connection.
Sales law, he wrote, was only one part of an overall "seamless web" of private
and regulatory law. Sales law was in particular tied to other fields of law through
the concept of title. Removing the concept of title from sales law generally, as the
Code was designed to do, would tear the web, upsetting the way that sales law
meshed with other fields, such as tax law and bankruptcy law, in which the title
concept was important.303
As to the risk of loss provisions in particular, Williston pointed out that the
possession rule being applied to replace the Tarling rule was inconsistent with
precedent. The new rule was entirely a product of the scholars drafting the Code,
existed "nowhere" else, and thus was bound to create interstate and international
conflicts3 4 He offered a few other minor criticisms of the risk provisions,
including finding them undesirably complex and also incomplete?0 5 Finally, he
acknowledged, without substantively commenting upon, the reliance on principles
of contract 6 and the practical consideration of insurance30 7 in the Code.
While Williston did not object to refocussing attention to principles of con-
tract and insurance, he did object strenuously to the removal of the lump title
concept from goods sales law generally. tt Thus, there was at least to some degree
a strange discrepancy between the younger Williston's career-long successful
campaign to reform land sales law, and the older Williston's response to the
innovations Llewellyn and Corbin had carried into goods sales law. In an indirect
sense, Williston's 1950 statement opposed in goods law the very innovations he
had championed in land law. The high value he placed on keeping interstate and
international uniformity in goods sales laws explains away only part of his
puzzling inconsistency.3 9 Perhaps a bit more can be attributed to some
302. Id.
303. Id. at 568-69.
304. Id. at 583.
305. Id. at 582-83.
306. Williston referred to section 2-401, in which it is stated that the sales portion of the Code "deals
with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step-by-step performance or nonperformance under the
contract." Id. at 568; see id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-401, cmt. 1). Again, he criticized the Code for tearing the
overall web of law by eliminating the concept of title, but he did not specifically object to the proposition of
using principles of contract to guide risk of loss doctrine or other aspects of sales law. See id. at 568-69.
307. See id. at 583. Williston acknowledged the role given insurance in section 2-510, which in certain
circumstances imposes risk on the seller to the extent of the buyer's deficiency in insurance. He criticized the
section on grounds other than its use of insurance as a principle for loss allocation. Id.
308. Williston found the Code's departure from pre-Code law on the topic of title an "objectionable and
irreparable feature .... Id. at 570-71.
309. Williston's extremely strong concern for preserving uniformity was also evident in his reaction to
the 1940 Federal Sales Bill. The federal bill was modelled after the Sales Act and duplicated its core
provisions, including the risk of loss provisions. However, it varied from the Sales Act in several other
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combination of illness, advanced age, and personal bitterness toward
Llewellyn.3t° To some extent, however, there is simply an unexplained
inconsistency.
Perhaps Williston's strange response to the Code has contributed to the
conventional failure to recognize his role in bringing about the very innovations
that are represented in the Code's risk of loss provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Risk of loss has long been recognized as among the most troubled areas in the
fields of sales of goods and sales of land. That troubled nature is now again being
demonstrated by efforts to rewrite the relevant provisions of the Code governing
sales of goods. Those provisions have remained largely untouched since
Llewellyn first drafted them a half century ago. The present rare opportunity to
reopen the Code makes this an important period for scholars to have a full
understanding of the history and underlying theories of the Code's risk of loss
provisions. The conjunction of this opportunity with the 100th anniversary of
relatively minor respects. Williston opposed the bill because even its minor variations from the Sales Act model
would lead to a lack of uniformity between state and federal law, and then to a lack of uniformity between
states as some states would likely begin to follow the federal model. See Samuel Williston, A Statement [on
the Proposed Federal Sales Act], 26 VA. L. REV. 637 (1940) (adopting the views stated by his colleague
McCurdy).
Williston's concern with uniformity, and thus his willingness to favor stability even in the face of needed
change, was a reflection of his generation. He had been a founder and major leader in the Restatement
movement, as well as in the Uniform Laws movement, and even a leading player in the early movement to
develop a national sales law, all of which were aspects of a general early 20th century desire for developing
uniformity.
310. At the timeo f the 1950 article, Williston was 88 years old. See WLLMsTN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra
note 64, at 3 (reporting his birthdate as September 24, 1861). He had been retired since 1938. See id. at 333.
He had suffered extended bouts of debilitating illness throughout his career, sometimes unable to work for
years at a time, and had continued to suffer such incapacity after his retirement. See id at 142-66, 327, 331-32.
The 1950 article was the first he had published in several years, and was his last significant article.
In his autobiography, written in 1940, Williston devoted a chapter to the changing schools of
jurisprudence he had observed and in which he had participated in during his career. He made several pointed
references to the way that Llewellyn, as a leader of the school of Legal Realism, had treated Williston. He
bridled at the labels Llewellyn had publicly applied to Williston. Id. at 209, 214. In several passages he barely
concealed a degree of bitterness toward Llewellyn. For example, he characterized the Realists, Llewellyn chief
among them, as having "a tendency, if not to frenzy, at least to exaggerated statement." Id. at 211-12.
In the 1950 article, Williston also commented that the decision to develop a new law of sales, rather than
merely amend the existing Sales Act, had been taken "contrary to my expressed judgment." When Williston
had, despite that overruling, attempted to assist by offering suggestions for the new Code, most of his
suggestions had been rejected by Llewellyn's committee. Williston, The Proposed Code, supra note 54, at 561
n.l. With that background, Williston even pleaded with readers not to dismiss his views as "warped" or
motivated by "pecuniary interests" rising from his treatises and casebooks built around pre-Code law. Id.
Tension between Williston and Llewellyn was evident much earlier, during the drafting of the Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. Williston persuaded the Commissioners to reject most of Llewellyn's
suggestions for the Act, and conflict between the two was sufficiently intense that one observer characterized
Williston as having "annihilated" Llewellyn's arguments. See 1934 Proceedings, supra note 203, at 27.
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Williston's seminal work in the field makes it even more appropriate to explore
thathistory now.
This article has brought to light an important chapter missing from the
conventional view of the history of the risk of loss rules in the Code. This missing
chapter demonstrates that the innovations long credited to Karl Llewellyn actually
originated in the work of Samuel Williston. More importantly, this missing
chapter ties goods law to earlier developments in the field of sales of land. That
connection provides a previously-untapped well of resources to gain greater
understanding of goods law.
The recent criticism of the Code and the current plans for its rewriting
demonstrate that, even a half century after the Code's drafting, it remains
important to grasp the full import of the blending of underlying principles in the
risk of loss provisions. The debate accompanying these reform efforts also
demonstrates that there is much still not well understood about how Llewellyn
and company formulated the current provisions to serve their underlying
principles.
The historical record of Williston's work in the field of land sales is rich with
material that could be of great value in developing greater understanding of the
Code's provisions. This article is meant as a first step in making that material
available to scholars of the law of sales of goods. The path is now open. Let us
see what we can find along the way.

